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2period and especially after World War II. For it was
actually only after the War that organized labor was firmly
entrenched in the mass production industries, as well as in
the trades, and able to exercise its full rights in a free
capitalistic society.
The importance of this field in our industrialized
society, and the intense need for more knowledge about it,
could not be more amply illustrated than by the turmoil
that existed between labor and management in 1945 and
This was a time in which strikes and wildcat strikes
were an everyday occurrence and timely agreements somewhat
rare.
The theorizing and research that began in this
period focused mainly on the local union-management rela-
tionship, the reasons for which are best expressed by
Derber, et al:
" a substantial majority of collective
bargaining agreements in the United States
are negotiated by local unions and local
plant managements. Attention to the
local relationship has also been stimulated
by the strong emphasis on 'human relations'
in industry. But most of all, this
interest has resulted from the widespread
belief that 'good' or 'constructive' or
'harmonious' relations at the plant level
are impor~ant to the s~rviva~ and ~rowth of
a productlve, democratlc sOClety."
1Milton Derber, W. Ellison Chalmers, and Ross
Stagner, The Local Union-Management Relationship, Institute
of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois
(Urbana, 1960), p. 1.
3The study of the local union-management relation-
ship has generally taken two courses. Practitioners
within the field have stressed the uniqueness of the
local relationship and have thus valued the study of
the union-management relationship "as a study of 'cases',
a source of possible 'insights' and suggestions in the
?exercise of a practical art."- On the other hand, acade-
micians value the field of study "as a basis for dis-
covering uniformities and making comparisons among cate-
gories.,,3 For the academicians, the objective has been
the formation of an "organi zed body of knovvledge with a
theoretical framework and generalizable conclusions.,,4
Most of the writing and research on the local
union-management relationship has been concerned with
defining the conditions necessary for, or conducive to,
industrial peace. However, before this topic could be
developed, certain definitions had to be set forth which
would cover a majority of the many different situations.
This alone turned out to be a difficult task. For example,
2Ibid., p. 2.
JIbid.
hIbid.
how does one define industrial peace? The National Planning
Association Committee defines industrial peace as:
"The product of the relationship bet.ween two
organized groups - industrial management and
organized labor - in whi ch both coexist , with
each retaining its institutional sovereignity,
working together in reasonable harmony ip a
climate of mutual trust and confidence.")
Lester and Robie attempted to get union and manage-
ment to agree on a criteria for industrial peace. While
the parties did offer a number of tests, they could not
come to such an agreement. The authors did, however
extend this proposal:
"Certainly one of the tests of successful labor
relations is the ability of the parties to re-
solve serious issues and conflicts o~ interest
without resort to economic \!varfare."o
of disagreement. In today's industrial relations, this
One common thread that runs through almost all
definitions, however, is the reference, either directly
or indirectly, to the sanctions resorted to in the case
would refer almost exclusively to disagreement in contract
negotiations, since arbitration has become a highly forma-
lized procedure for settling disputes between contract
t:
JClinton S. Golden and Virginia D. Parker (eds.),
Causes of Industrial Peace Under Collective Bar "ainin:,
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. Based on a project
sponsored by the National Planning Association.
6Richard A. Lester and Edward A. Robie, Construct4ve
Labor Relations: Experience in Four Firms, Industrial
Relations Section, Princeton University, 1948.
5negotiations. The fact that such sanctions have been
stressed in defining industrial peace is not so surpris-
ing when one considers the effect these measures may have
beyond the local relationship and the coverage given them
by the national mass news media.
There have been four general approaches used in
the study of local union-management relationships to analyze
or predict their outcome, i.e., timely settlement or work
stoppage. The most popular approach has been concerned
with isolating factors which are pertinent to the achieve-
ment of a harmonious relationship. The second has been what
could be called a typological approach, that is, relation-
ships are categorized in terms of the characteristics of
that relationship. The third approach has focused on examin-
ing the dynamics of the collective bargaining process
1
I:
:1
: :
" 'itself. The fourth, and most general, approach examines
the local union-management relationship in terms of its
relationship to and development in a larger system.
The purpose behind the factor approach to the study
of the local union-management relationship has been two-
fold. First, researchers have tried to uncover those
variables determining a particular type of relationship.
For example, Walton and McKersie view an existing rela-
tionship as a result of:
"(1) the technological market and power context
of the parties, (2) the basic personality dis-
positions of key individuals in the relationship,
(3) the social belief systems of these individuals,
" I
6
usually shared in some degree by their respective
organizations, and (4) the actual ~argaining
experience t.hat they have shared."
Given a certain type of relationship, the second
purpose underlying the use of the factor approach has been
to isolate factors relevant to the conflict-free settlement
of disputes or disagreements. Some of the following are
illustrative of such factors: past administration of the
contract, poor usage of bargaining techniques, misevaluation
of importance of issues, pressure of pattern settlements,
community atmosphere, etc.
The typological approach to the study of the local
union-management relationship has also been attempted. In
some cases a typology of relationships has simply been an
outgrowth of some other approach and, in other cases, it
has been an approach followed for its own merits. Quite
simply, this approach involves characterizing a number of
relationships along a continuum ranging from "collusion"
to "conflict" in order to better understand the dynamics of
these relationships and the manner in whi.ch the parties
interact to settle the issues and problems before them.
The typology of union-management relationships
formulated by Derber, .§.! al, was developed from a study
of forty-one individual union-management relationships.
7Richard E. Walton and Robert B.
Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations,
Hill Book Company, 1965,)P· 190.
McKersie, A
(New York:-McGraw-
7As a result of examining these relationships, the authors
came up with five major types of relationships which they
characterized as: "aggression and resistance", "quiescence",
"moderate jOint participation", "repressed hostility", and
"extensive joint participation".
The purpose of examining the dynamics of the
collective bargaining process, the third possible approach,
is primarily to illuminate all the factors involved so that
through a better understanding many of the pitfalls inherent
to negotiations can be avoided. Specifically, writings on
the collective bargaining process have focused on bargaining
techniques, tactics, pressures (both internal and external)
on the parties, communications, etc. The approach has
on its role in the bargaining process, or to set up a
either been to treat each facet individually and elaborate
bargaining model and treat all of the facets of bargaining
within this model.
Of the many bargaining models that have been pro-
posed, the model developed by Walton and McKersie is per-
haps one of the most comprehensive and reflective of the
actual process. Walton and McKersie begin with the premise
that the collective bargaining process is composed of four
distinguishable subprocesses, all of which are interrelated
in labor relations. They term these subprocesses "distribu-
tive bargaining", "integrative bar-ga lni ngv , "attitudinal
structuring" and "intra-organizational bargaining".
While the authors' discussion of each facet of the
collective bargaining process is quite comprehensive, their
most significant accomplishment is the manner in whi.ch they
were able to tie in the results of other approaches, i.e.,
the factor approach and the typological approach, to their
description of the dynamics of the bargaining process.
Factors relevant to the bargaining relationship and the con-
duct of negotiations, as well as a development of a typology
of relationships and the implications of these points to the
bargaining process were discussed under attitudinal structur-
ing and intra-organizational bargaining.
The last approach to an understanding of the union-
management relationship and industrial relations in general
lS that of a description of the local relationship in terms
of its development in and relationship to a larger system.
While this approach has not found many adherents, it is
mentioned mainly because of the contribution of John T.
Dunlop.
In Dunlop's book, Industrial Relations Systems,
an attempt is made to answer the follow~ng questions:
(1) how is the industrial relations system related to the
society a whole; (2) how is the industrial relations
system related to the economic system; and (J) what are
the characteristics of the inner structure and the in-
dustrial relations subsystem itself.9
9John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations System,(New York: Henry Hold and Company, 1958), p.
9Dunlop goes about answering these questions by first
enumerating the relevant parties (which he calls "actors")
in the industrial relations system. He states the follow~ng
three actors are found within such a system:
"1. A hierarchy of managers and their represen-
tatives in supervision
2. A hierarchy of workers (nonmanagerial) and
any spokesman, and
3. Specialized governmental agencies (and speci-
alized private agencies created by the first
tW? actors) c~n?erned w~th w?rker~~ enter-
pr-a ses , and t.hei r- r-eLat.icnsh.ips ;"
There are three important aspects of the environ-
ment which Dunlop sees as affecting the interation of the
actors:
"(1) the technological characteristics of the
wor k place and work comrnunity, (2) the market or
budgetary constraints which impinge on the actors,
and (3) the 10cu~land distribution of power in the
larger society."
Dunlop concludes that the rules which are est abLished
to guide the relationship depend on the state of the society,
the state of the industrial relations system within the
society, the power structure of the actors in the system,
and the relevance of one of the aspects in the environment
in which the industrial relations system is developing.
It is useful to note that the methodology used in
most studies within each approach has been limited to the
examination of samples of union-management relationships
lOIbOd 7.___l_. , p.
11Ibid. , p. 9.
~ ......c..-=---
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within a very limited time span. These relationships and
their characteristics would then be compared to find pat-
terns or consistencies on why certain relationships develop,
what factors within the various relationships are important
to industrial peace, wh at. are the characteristics of the
bargaining process within each relationship, etc. There is
a very practical reason for the preference of this method
over that of gathering data by examining the local relation-
ships over much longer periods of time, and that is the
difficulty of collecting data, and the time involved.
With this background on the general orientation of
the literature and a very brief review of the methodology
used, it is now possible to develop the subject matter of
this thesis. As stated earlier, because of the importance
attached to work stoppages as a reflection of industrial
peace, this one measure of the success of union-management
relations would be the principle topic of this thesis. More
specifically, "in contrast to the methodology w~dely used, a
local union-management relationship will be examined from
its inception, over a seventeen year period, for the purpose
of determining the following:
1. What factorsitJere relevant to the outcome, l.e.,
work stoppage or timely settlement of the negotiations?
2. Did the factors maintain the same relative
position of importance from one negotiation to another?
3. Did the character of the union-management
relationship change over time; and if so, did the changes
11
occur »i s.thin the continuum developed by Derber, ~ aI , and
was there a relationship between that change and a change
in factors relevant to the outcome of the negotiations?
In addition, a general review of the data will be
made as it reflects on the collective bargaining model of
Walton and McKersie. Specifically, the individual negotia-
tions will be examined with a view toward validating the
authors' distributive and integrative bargaining models.
CHAPTER I
While the major approaches to the study of collec-
tive bargaining were briefly reviewed in the Introduction,
a more detailed analysis of the literature under consider-
ation is necessary. Such an examination will set forth the
theoretical framework for considering the data to be dis-
cussed in Chapter III.
Perhaps the most appropriate place to begin an
examination of collective bargaining is to look at what the
parties involved, i. e., management, union, and worker,
hope to achieve from this process. Stated somewhat different-
ly, what function does this process play in the industrial
organization for the parties involved. In discussing this
pOint, it is also necessary to examine the motivations of
the parties since there is a relationship between motivation
and the function served by the process.
In past years, and to some extent even to the present,
authorities in the field thought that workers were primarily
money motivated. For example, a study by K. M. Thompson on
what union members want concluded that:
"Wages are the prime element influencing
employee satisfaction in unionized indus-
t r-y . He says that psychological rewards,
12
13
no matter how desirable, cannot serve as I?
substitutes for collecti ve\j\Jageagreements." -
This philosophy of human motivation, however, has been
largely discounted by present day psychologists and
managers alike. As Ross Stagner states:
"A second common error in the field of the
psychology of motivation as applied to in-
dustry may be called the 'dollar fallacy'.
According to this view ... workers
are motiva~~d only by what is in the pay
envelope."
and:
" . wages are not the most important moti-
vator for persons in industry . . . ego moti-
vation rather1than economic motivation is
predominant."
Perhaps a morevvidely accepted theory of human moti-
vation in today's world is that espoused by Maslow. Maslow
sees man's behavior as being dictated by a hierachy of
needs: physiological needs, safety needs, need for love and
acceptance, ego needs, and the need for self-actualization.
. 12Marvin D. Dunnette and Wayne K. Kirchner, Psy-
chology Applied to Industry, (New York: Meredith PubIlshing
Co~npany, 19(5), r- 201, clting K. M. Thompson, "Human
Helations in Collective Bargaining," Harvard Business Review,
1953, Vol. 31, pp. 116-126.
131. L. Heckmann, Jr. and S. G. Huneryager, HumanHelat~ons in Mana~ement, (Cinn., south-Western Publi~hi~g
Co., 1960), p. 15 , quoting Ross Stagner, "Psychologl cal
Aspects of Industrial Conflict: II Motivation," Personnel
Psychology, Vol. 3, No.1, (Spring 1950), pp. 1-15·
IhDunnette and Kirchner, .£E. cit., p. 201, quoting
Ross Stagner, "Psychological Asp~cts of Industrial Conflict:
II Motivation," Personnel Psychology, Vol. 3, No.1 (Spring
1950), pp. 1-15·
lLr
Simply stated, at any point in time, the prime motivator de-
pends on the need level on which the organism is operating.
Thus, if man has fulfilled his basic needs of nourishment,
shelter, etc., he will be motivated by those things which
offer security to him and the things he has already achieved.
The implications of Maslow's theory of motivation
in collective bargaining are simply this: depending on the
need level on which the wor-ker-s are operating, those factors
wh i.ch offer to fulfill that need will be at the top of their
list of demands. Expressing this differently, we could say
that basically the purpose of collective bargaining for the
worker is to achieve the fulfillment of his most basic un-
satisfied needs.
The gene:cal consensus as reflected by the f'oILowing
Writers since World War II in this field seems to be that,
for the most part, workers have progressed beyond the pOint
of just meeting the physiological needs of adequate food,
shelter and clothing and to a large degree the safety needs
of economic and psychological security. They point to other
areas as having greater motivational value. J. D. Houser
states:
"What the worker wan t s is a minimum essential
of life, and the word is consideration--regard
for his simple dig~~ty as a man. It is the
least he can aak v " _)
15Heckmann and Huneryager, £E. cit ., p. 160, quoting
J. D. Houser, What People Want From Business.
15
Heckman and Runeryager point out that "workers want more of
whatever is needed to maintain status at the time.,,16
In discussing reasons workers strike, Marrow points
to a motive that appears to be a search for self-actualiza-
tion:
"It is the discontent of workers who want some-
thing different out of life, different for them-
selves and for their own kids. The additional
money they demand is a symbol. It is not a
demand for more of the same thing, but a demand r
not consciously defined, for something different.,,17
Dunnette and Kirchner state:
"Wages do play an important role in collective
bargaining and usually are a primary issue in
negotiations. At the same time, however, de-
mands for increased wages may often reflect a
demand for status, prestige, and rec~§nition
instead of dollar and cents per se."
Based on the preceeding, it is reasonable to conclude
that today's worker is motivated by psychological and
monetary rewards to the extent that they enhance his status
within the groups with which he associates and fulfills his
need for ego satisfaction.
Having thus identified what the worker seeks to
achieve from the collective bargaining process, an analysis
can now be made of the union's interest in this process.
York:
161, .d 62~., p. 1 ~.
17Alfred J. Marrow, Making Management Human,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957), p. 36.
18Dunnette and Kirchner, .£E. cit., r- 201.
(New
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Describing the function of collective bargaining for
unions is not so difficult as that for the worker, since 1n
theory the union strives to obtain those things which wi Ll.
fulfill the workers' needs. R. Dubin, in discussing the
basis of union decisions in collective bargaining, stated
thissame proposition in these words:
"It does seem cLaa r that un i oriofficials pro-
posing to remain in elective office for any
period of\.:,imevvilldevelop the habit of de-
~laring that their decl~ions are in the in-
terest of 'the body'."
Unions also find the collective bargaining process
as a useful means of obtaining other objectives which may
or may not be in the interest of the workers they represent.
These objectives may include: (1) preserving and enhancing
the union itself; (2) preserving the existing union leader-
ship; and (3) impressing the company with its base of power.
It should be noted that at any particular time the
function of the collective bargaining process for the union
may vary accor-d i ng to wl.Lch of the aforementioned objectives
predominate. The predominance of anyone or more objectives
depends upon the existi~g circumstances. For example, a
union operating under the threat of an organizational raid
will see the collective bargaining process as a means of
solidifying its position as much as a means of meeting the
needs of the workers.
19Robert Dubin, Workin' Union-Mana ement Relations:
The Sociology of Industrial Relations, Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), p. 117.
17
The function of collective bargaining for management
is very basically that of prescribing those labor-management
policies which are perceived as conducive to efficient opera-
tions and consistent with overall corporate policies and
goals. Such labor-management policies can be discussed in
terms of those related to the parties' contractual obligations,
and of those related to the union-management relationship.
Within the category of policies relating to the
parties' contractual obligations, there are three primary
goals that management attempts to gain in collective bargain-
ing. The first of these goals concerns the economic settle-
ment and is quite aptly expressed by Beal and Wickersham:
"The employer's economic interest is best served
by that combination of wages, hours, and working
conditions which results in the ~Rwest possible
total unit costs of production.,,~J
The second basic goal management seeks to achieve lS
one of at least maintaining the existing distribution of
power, i.e., control over and responsibility for elements of
the operation. Maximum control of the operation is valued
by management for the flexibility it offers in making rapid
and possible sweeping changes in adapting to changing market
conditions. Dubin discusses collective bargaining as a
pOII'Jerst.ruct.ur-ein wh i cn the parties vie for what. is regarded
20Edwin F. Beal and Edward D. Wickersham, The
Practice of Collective Bar 'ainin , (Homewood,111.-:-
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1903 , p. 374·
as an important and necessary share. He states that:
"Distribution of power in power structl.1reS
seldom remain stable. Some person or group
is generally striving to control more impor-
tant functions, or control their present one
more exclusively. This is resisted by present
J?~wer hold~rs, who must give up 2~me power
If the strlvers are successful."
The third primary goal management hopes to obtain
out of negotiations is a settlement which will allow the
company to run in an orderly manner. Dubin sees three
characteristics of management's concept of order:
" (A) continuity with its past, (B) con-
trolled amount and di~ecti?n"of ?hange in the 2?
present, and (C) predl ctablll ty an the future.""~
This concept of order could be illustrated by a contract that
does not deeply alter basic procedures, methods of operation,
wage structure and/or policy, etc., and does not allow
strikeable issues during the term of the contract. That lS
to say, a philosophy of anti-unionism could be tempered at a
time when a strike would be especially harmful to other
aspects of the business. Bevars Mabry sees the following
relationship in the determination of management's approach
to labor relations:
"The approach to labor relcl.tionsby management
depends in part on the ideological value struc-
ture of management and its view of the union as
a threat to this structure, the economic condi-
tions of the company and the industry, the
nature of union leadership, and the amount of
experience that management has acquired in
21D 1 "UOln, ~. cit., pp. lL:.2-h3.
22I._.bl"d. , ?03p.,~ .
19
. . 2 C)
dealing with a particular labor organlzatlon." J./
Those management policies related to the union-
management relationship are most typically a product of
management philosophy and the prevailing circumstances.
Depending on the existing philosophy and the pre-
vailing circumstances, the collective bargaining process,
according to authorities, could be functional for such pur-
poses as: (1) limiting the effectiveness and thus the
prestige of the union; (2) completely undermining the union;
(3) enhancing the reputation of the union; (4) winning the
cooperation of the union; (5) impressing employees with the
company's goodwill; and (6) changing various union attitudes
towards management and/or collective bargaining.
As in the case with unions, which policies will pre-
dominate, as best serving the interest of management, will
very possibly shift from one negotiation to another, depending
on management's perception of the total existing situation.
Having considered the meaning of collective bargaining
mechanics of actual negotiations. Such a discussion should
to the parties involved, the next relevant topic concerns the
start with the manner in which the union establishes its de-
mands and the company its goals or objectives. This subject
can best be treated by categorizing these demands and goals
23Bevars D. Mabry, Labor Relations and Collective
Bargaining, (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1966),
p. 97·
20
into three groupS: (1) those relating to language or pro-
cedural changes; (2) those covering the economic issues; and
(3) those relating to the parties' relationship as discussed
previously.
Because changes relating to contractual procedures
or language can be readily formulated as joint problems,
Walton and McKersie see them as suited primarily to "in-
tegrative bargaining". Within this bargaining approach,
problems of mutual concern are discussed and solutions more
satisfactory to both parties are arrived at. For integrative
bargaining to be possible, however, Walton and McKersie see
as necessary mutual agreement in identifying the problem,
consideration of all alternative solutions and their con-
sequences, and a preference ordering of solutions and select-
ing a course of action.24 The authors also state that the
,
1,1
I
effectiveness of the integrative process depends on the
presence of the following psychological and informational
states: motivation, a free flow of information, trust, and
?c:
a supportive climate.-?
In considering which areas language or procedural
changes are desired, the parties generally look to the
following criteria:
(1) past administration of the contract provisions;
21~ "Walton and McKersie, .2£. 0·, p. 137·
25Ibid.
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(2) provisions most often questioned through the
grievance procedure;
(3) aspects of the relationship not covered by the
existing contract, but put into question; and
(4) provisions arbitrated through the grievance
procedure and establishing an interpretation unsatisfactory
to one or all of the parties concerned.
Issues in this area can have a twofold value for the
parties, i. e., the value involved in clarifying or changing
an aspect of the relationship and, if the issue is not too
critical, its value as a trading item for some monetary gain.
Typically, however, as the parties' relationship ages, these
issues become fewer in number, but more critical when they do
occur. Thus, for evaluative purposes, it becomes easier to
identify critical issues in this area as the relationship
I,
II
I,
matures.
vVhile procedural and language issues vary widely in
their importance depending upon the particular situation,
i
economic issues consistently retain a high priority status.
It is for this reason a more detailed analysis will be made
of the manner in v~ich the union's demands and the company's
goals evolve into economic issues.
It should be emphasized at this point in discussing
the union's demands and the company's goals, that we are
talking about their actual demands and goals, the ones they
admit to themselves. Walton and McKersie refer to such goals
22
and demands as "targets". As an illustration of this concept,
a union would vigorously seek a 15¢ per hour wage increase
throughout negotiations knowing full well that a lO¢ per hour
increase is actually what it hopes to finally achieve.
The criteria generally used for establishing and
justifying the parties' positions are well enumerated by
Torff:
"1.
2.
3 .
4·
5·
6.
7·
ability to pay
cost of living
minimum family budgets
productivitymaintenance and increase of purchasing power
areas or industry rate com@~risions
pattern wage adjustments."
All of these criteria are called into play by each party in
establishing its position. There are those criteria which
will support a party's position in one direction while other
criteria will act to keep the party's expectations in that
direction within realistic limits. At the same time the
maximum settlement points are also established. Again
party's targets are established, to some degree, minimum and
Walton and McKersie refer to these as "resistance pOints".
An interesting point to note, when discussing the
criteria used in setting targets and resistance points, that
each of the criteria could be used to support either party's
position at different times during the lifetime of the relation-
ship. For example, during periods of economic growth and in-
26c' Ioe vvyn
McGraw-Hill Book
(Neill!York:
23
flation, unions could use the cost-of-living criterion to
justify a large wage increase. However during periods of
deflation, unions would obviously not point to cost-of-liv-
ing to justify an increase. Torff expounds on this point in
stating that:
" the approach of both unions and employers
to the above listed criteria is fundamentally
opportunistic. Whichever criteria support a
bargaining party's position at any given time ar~'7
invoked; the rest are glossed over or rejected."
To summarize, vvehave said that the parties involved in bar-
gaining make use of all the above cited criteria in establish-
ing their targets and resistance points. However, once the
negotiations have begun, the parties will only invoke those
criteria which support their positions, making the assump-
tion that the other party will invoke those criteria wh i.ch
support his position and deflate the other party's position.
Before leaving this topic of the establishment of a
party's targets and resistance points, it is necessary to
discuss how Walton and McKersie see their interrelationship.
Referring to Exhibit I (see page 24), Walton and McKersie
see Example A as the typical relationship of the parties'
positions in negotiations, that is, the upper resistance
point of the company overlaping the union's lower resistance
pOint to form a positive "settlement range". The purpose
then of negotiations is to bring opponents' positions to the
outer most extremity of this range.
EXHIBIT I
EXAMPLE (A)
RESISTANCE \POINT . U7NIONTARGETPOSITIVE SETTLEJVJENT
RANGE ~,r==>: -""" /° ' 't,/ xDollars
------CO-M-j-i
A
-
N
-
Y
COflJP ANY\ H~SIS'l'ANCE
TARGET POINT
UNION
EXAMPLE (B)
o COMPANY~
mJUOI/TARGET
NEGATIVE
SETTLEMENT RANGE
~.._-----
\ ... j_--I-----XDOllars
COMPANY UNIONRESISTANCE RESISTANCE
POINT POINT
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While Example B in Exhibit I is not the typical
situation in negotiations as seen by Walton and McKersie, it
lS a situation which could arise and quite possibly result
In power bargaining, that is, strike, lockout, etc., before
a settlement is reached. This situation arises where either
one or both parties' position(s) is so unrealistic that there
is no overlap in their resistance points and thus no settle-
ment range or rather a negative settlement range. To exemplify
how a negative settlement range can occur, Walton and McKersie
cite Albert Rees' study on the relationship of the business
cycle to the tendency for the parties to develop incompatible
. . 2g(reslstance pOlnts). Rees' conclusion, as itexpectations
relates to the vvalton-McKersie model, was that a "negative
settlement range' is most likely to occur just prior to the
peak business activity.
The conclusion of this subject on the establishment ,I,.
to a discussion of the manner, the "strategies" and "tactics"
of the parties' positions and their interrelationship leads
the parties use in order to bring about the final compromise
settlement.
strategies would be interesting, it would also be superfluous.
While a discussion of the many different types of
Of much more importance is a discussion on the purpose or
role of strategy in collective bargaining.
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In discussing strategy as it relates to collective
bargaining, we are basically talking about that method of
procedure which the parties see as providing the highest
probability for attainment of their goals. More specifi-
cally, it is a prescribed course of action for evaluating
and influencing the other party's true position, thus lay-
ing the groundwork for an atmosphere conducive to acceptance
of the party's final position. The implications of this
(1) the parties do not openly reveal their
definition are:
real goals or demands, and (2) since the parties do not
reveal their real positions, each party must try to influence
positions he perceives as real. Obviously the purpose of
evaluating the opponent's position is to ascertain what and
how much must be contained in a proposal in order to make it I:j',
satisfactory to opponent's needs.
an integral part of any strategy in that he sees the parties
Dubin acknowledges the importance of evaluation as
evaluating each other's position throughout negotiations.
Specifically, he sees three steps of evaluation leading up to
driving the final bargain:
"The first step in any system of bargaining is
to know the issues at question. Each party to the
potential bargain must know what he vlTants, what
the other party wants and is willing to offer,
and what the potential area of compromise between
every difference might be .
"The second stage in bar'gaining requires an appraisal
by each party of the differences betwBen expressed
demands and what will be finally accepted
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"'The third stage in bargaining is one in which
secrecy and sl~ness is likely to be the dominant
motif. A tremendous amount of time may be spent
at this state of bargaining, trying to develop
clues a~~ut the real intentions of the other
party." "
Walton and McKersie view this evaluating process as
one in which the parties attempt to determine the "subjective
expected utility" of the other party's demands and thereby
distinguish the real issues. 'The authors, in turn, see the
process of influencing the opponent's position as one of
altering the "subjective expected utilities" of the various
lssues in order to bring them in line with the party's
position.
Walton and McKersie thus view a successful strategy
as one which allows the parties to accomplish the following:
costs .
(2)
for
(3)
his
(4)
and
"(1) to assess the opponent's utilities and strike
. to ascertain his resistance point.
. to conceal or misrepresent the utilities
the party inherent in the agenda items.
. to modify the opponent's perceptions of
own utilities.to manipulate 5ee strike costs of the party
the opponent."
i'
, {
"
Tactics should be construed as tools for carrying out
a particular strategy. 'Thus various tactics could be employed
to force opponent to reveal his real position, to alter oppo-
nent's perception of actual strike costs, and to conceal one's
own utilities.
29Dubin, QE. ill" pp. 15Le-56.
30Ibid., p. 61.
Perhaps the most, well known tactic is the union's use
of the strike weapon. As Beal and Wickersham point out:
"Unless it sets a specific date and time, the
strike vote taken early in the negotiations is
almost al~ays a maneuver: a mere thr~at,~~
psychologlcalvveapon, a cold-war r.act i c .II)
The union's use of this tactic is basically for the purpose
of altering the company's perception of its strike cost and
thus a reevaluation of its resistance point. A counter
tactic to a strike threat is the threat that large inventories
have been compiled and, if a strike ensues, it will be a long
one. This counter tactic can be especially effective if the
parties previously endured a long strike. The purpose of
such a tactic for the company is exactly
the same ac the,~
strike threat used by the union.
Other tactics the parties may employ
are those In-
II
(
vol ving cornrnittment-non-c ommittment, bluff -non-bl"Llff,hos-
tility, and use of public sympathies. The tactics of com-
mittment-non-committment and bluff-non-bluff are closely
related in that the use of one almost always involves the use
of the other. Stevens illustrates this relationship stating:
"One major problem confronted by the player of
notbluff is conveying to his opposite number the
truth regarding his intended course of action ....
In short, the player of notbluff may be in need of
some device whereby he may pledge or commit himself,
to the satisfaction of his opponent, to a course of
')1) Beal and Wickersham, 2.E' cit., p. 279.
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action wh i ch he 3?intends to pursue." ~
The problem for the party in this situation 1S to find that
device, i.e., some management principle, to which a committ-
ment will be convincing to the opponent.
The successful use of the bluff tactic is more
difficult in that it involves establishing credibility with-
out giving the cl_ppearanceof comrnittment. In discussi.rigthe
use of the bluff tactic, Stevens sees the problem as one of:
" . making a demand while at the same time
av oadLng even the appearance of cOlmnittrnent--
avoiding 'i?e1ng, deeme~ ~Y the op~lo/site nurnb ez-
to have '~ssued an uLt.amatum I." ..J
Stevens sees the answer to establishing credibility of a
bluff through indirect modes especially that of misrepre-
sentation of preferences.
" may be used to jntimidate the other side
to disclose its position out of fear the hosti-
lity and threats might ingender. .. Hostility
is functional in achieYing a bargain, and parti-
cularly in preparing the situation for mutual
compro~~se through revelation of real goals and
aims. ".J e
f :';:'.
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Dubin points out the usefulness of hostility as a
tactic in that it:
Again in turning to Dubin, the usefulness of public
sympathy as a tactic can be seen:
32Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining
Ne~otiation, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
19 3), p. 78.
33Ibid., r- 93.
34Dubin, .£E. cit., pp. 158-59.
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"If it develops within the secrecy stage of
bargaining, that both parties become unwilling
to move rapidly toward revealing their true
intentions, the parties may turn to the public
in order to enlist their symp~thy ~~d thus to
apply pressure to the other Slde."
While the use of the aforementioned tactics can be an
integral part of a successful strategy, if used improperly
or under the wrong circumstances, the damage could very well
be irreparable in terms of obtaining a settlement wi, thout
the use of force.
One aspect of collective bargaining which has not yet
been revie\i'Jed,but which plays an important role, is the
psychological phenomenon involved in the process. As regards
the psychological phenomenon, this discussion will be limited
to a review of the role of personality and attitudes. Be-
cause Derber, Chalmers and Stagner's study on relationship
patterns is closely related to the above mentioned psycholo-
gical factors, a discussion of this study will be considered
last.
Perhaps the most apparent psychological factor in-
volved in contract negotiations is the personality structure
of the negotiators. While research in the area of personality
has not advanced to the state of being able to prescribe that
conglomeration of personality factors most conducive to
successful negotiations, authorities in the field of labor
relations appear to have reached agreement on the following
35Ibid., p. 159·
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f 36.actors:
1. the "intelligence" to absorb the full implica-
tions of the complexities involved in the process;
2. the "creativeness" to forsee and deal effec-
tively with changing and unusual situations unhampered by
set opinions, ethics, and rules of thumb;
3. the "personal adjustment" necessary to obtain
the respect, trust and confidence of the opponent;
4. the "salesmanship" required to communicate and
convince the opponent of the merits of one's position; and
5. the "determination" to overcome minor, major and
frustrating obstacles in order to achieve one's goals.
It is important to note in conclusion that every In-
dividual possesses these characteristics to some degree, but
it is the rare individual who has developed strengths in all
these areas. Thus to the degree that a negotiator is de-
ficient in one or more of these areas, the more difficult the
process becomes as a satisfactory means of meeting the
parties' goalS.
The attitudes that the parties bring into the nego-
tiating process may also play a determinative role in the
effectiveness of this process.
Attitudes relevant to the
36See Beal and Wickersham, .2.£. S·, p. 28~,; SumnerH. Slichter, James J. Healy, and E. Robert Livernash, The
ImJact of Collective Bar ainin on Mana ement, (Washington,
D.C., The Brookings Institution, 19 0 , p. 9; and Sara E.
Southall, Industry's Unfinished Business, (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1950), p. 42.
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parties' relationship in the negotiating process have two
origins: those developed during the parties' formative
years, and those developed during the tenure of the relation-
ship. This discussion will deal specifically with the rele-
vance of the parties' attitudes towards each other as
developed out of the relationship, since the other type
attitudes are more of a general orientation and fall better
into a discussion of personality.
It should be noted at this point that, in discussing
the parties' attitudes towards each other, the assumption lS
made that the type of relationship the parties have is a
reflection of their attitudes. This is a reasonable assump-
tion to make, since many of the typological studies referred
to in the Introduction use the parties' attitudes as a
criteria for classifying relationships.
The first logical question to ask, ~len considering
such attitudes, is hoW do they develop, what factors con-
tribute to their formation? Kerr and Siegel see external
factors to the collective bargaining relationship as setting
limits on the type of relationship the parties may develop.
However, they add, such limitations usually allow enough room
for variation in that the parties are free to establish a
good b d I . h· 37or a re atlons lp.
37Derber, Chalmers and Stagner, ~. ill.., p. 72,
quotirw Clark Kerr and Abraham J. Siegel, "Fundamentals of
Labor Peace, A Final Report, Case Study No. 1h", National
Planning Association, 1953, pp. 47-4g.
Dunnette and Kirchner, pointing to the results of a
study by Stagner in 1948, came to the general conclusion that
within the above mentioned limits the major characteristic
of the parties' attitudes, i.e., union and management re-
presentatives, was a feeling of suspicion and distrust toward
38one anot her .
Beal and Wickersham expand on this particular
attitude characteristic by discussing the influence of the
overall experience in the parties' relationship. Briefly,
the authors carne to the following conclusion:
"The hist.ory and experience of a given local
union and the labor relations policy and re-
cord of the company with which it deals have
much to do with the uni~~'s militancy, its
willingness to strike."
Keith Davis perhaps found the solution to the
problems created by suspicious attitudes and pOOr relation-
ships in wha t he calls the "mirror effect". Basically Davis
concludes that management bears the main responsibility for
the relationship developed in that management's attitude
toward the other party and toward collective bargaining breeds
the same attitudes on the part of the union. Davis calls
upon Stagner's conclusions in a 1955 article to place this
burden on management's shoulders. Stagner saw management as
having this responsibility for two reasons: (1) manap'ernentc::
"8JDunnette and Kirchner, QE. cit., p. 193.
39Beal and Wickersham, ~. cit., p. 280.
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is the dominate party in the union-management relationship;
and (2) management has more to gain by improving the relation-
ship and its leaders are more free to act than union officials.
If the above is accepted, then in looking towards creation of
a more cooperative attitude and relationship, it would be well
for management to heed the following recommendation from the
Department of Labor:
"In the same American tradition both labor and
management must corne to a realization that both
can func~ion most effectively when each enjoys (
the confldence and has the consent of the other.,,4
J
Having thus considered the role of psychological
variables on the union-management relationship and specifi-
cally on collective bargaining, it is now possible to discuss
Derber, Chalmers, and Stagner's study of relationship patterns.
In review, it was mentioned in the Introduction that these
authors developed from their study a continLHUYlof relation-
ships ranging from "aggression and resistance" to "extensive
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jointparticipation". The relationships studied were cate-
gorized vvithin this range on the basis of three variables:
(1) union influence in the union-management relationship,
taking into account the scope and variety of issues brought
up in collective bargaining and the depth of penetration by
the union; (2) the degree to which pressure tactics were used
40partners In Production:
Committee of the Twentieth Centur
Nichols, New York: Twentieth Cen
p. 86.
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by the parties; and (3) the attitudes of the parties toward
each other.
The characteristics of the relationship patterns
developed were as follows:
"(a) Aggression and resistance, reflecting high
union influence, unfavorable attitudes, an un-
friendly emotional tone, high use of pressure,
high reliance on past practice and informality in
contract administration, slow grievance settle-
ment and frequent inability to negotiate a new
agreement without the assistance of outside
mediators.
(b) Quiescence, reflecting low union influence,
absence of pressure, favora~le attitudes, friendly
emotional tone, and low rellance on past practice.
(c) Moderate joint participation, reflecting moder-
ate union influence, absence of pressure, favorable
attitudes, friendly emotional tone, ability to
settle negotiations without assistance, rapid
grievance settlement, low reliance on past practice
and a willingneSs to make concessions to the other '
side.
Cd) Repressed hostility, reflecting moderate union
influence, an absence of pressure due to union weak-
ness and inabi~ity to ser~ously challenge management,
and unstable, lnformal grleVance process based on
low understanding.
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It should be noted that at any point in time a relationship
may not fit within anyone of the clusters, but may be in a
(e) Extensive joint participation, reflecting a
high union influence and favorable attitudes,
a considerable degree of initiative and give and
take by both sides without the use of pressure
although often requiring the assistance of media-
tors in contract negotiations, a high reliance
on past practice in grievance settlement but with
a willingneSs to make exceptio~s toLihe contract
and concessions to the other slde." I·
41Derber, Chalmers, and Stagner, Q£. cit., p. Ill".
transitional stage between relationships.
In this study, the authors also tried to find out
whether there was a relationship between the parties' atti-
tudes toward each other and the degree of satisfaction with
the relationship. The results of this analysis indicated
that management's attitude toward the union is probably a
summation of the degree of satisfaction felt with the various
areas of interaction, and the union's attitude toward manage-
ment apparently was contingent on satisfaction with depth of
influence, with grievance settlement, and with contract
negotiations.h2
Summarily, in this chapter an attempt has been made
to examine the literature identifying those factors that pre-
communications, which have received wide attention in the
labor relations literature, but which have not been included
'.'1.1
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sumably corne into play in the collective bargaining process.
There are several other factors, namely perception and
in this review. A treatment of these factors was not In-
eluded primarily because the data was not adequate to allow
conclusions on the role of these factors within the relation-
ship under study. Prior to considering the applicability of
these theories and research findings to the contract negotia-
tions at the XYZ Company, historical facts relevant to this
company's union-management relationship and its contract
negotiations will be reviewed.
h2Ibid., p. 87·
CHAPTER II
review and surnmarize research on the present day theories of
In the preceding chapter an attempt was made to
the dynamics of the collective bargaining process- In
part~cular, Walton and McKersie's distributive and integra-
tive bargaining models, and Derber, Chalmers and Stagneria
contLnuum of relationships were discussed as they relate to
this process. As indicated in the Introduction, the union~
management relationship at one company will be examined in
order to determine which factors cited by these authorities
appeared relevant in the shaping of that relationship and in
the resulting negotiations. In order to later recognize
those factors which played a major role in this shaping, and
especially in the collective bargaining process, it is first
necessary to review the historical development of this com-
pany.
The lIZ CorporatiOn began its existence on April 6,
1906 as an engineering organization specializing in residen-
tial heating and air conditioning. Mr. H. Brown, the founder
of the organization, began operations with a capitalization
of ~U5,000 and his own original concept of horne heating.
This company continued as an engineering firm until
after 'World War I when l't purchBlsed pat.snt rights on a
37
38
schoolroom heating and ventilating unit from another firm.
At this point the XYZ Company moved into the school heating
market. While there were great risks involved in this move,
the results proved very favorable. By 1925 the company had
surpassed a million and a quarter dollar sales volume with a
profit of over $350,000.
The company's move into this new product, as well as
a line of industrial heaters several years later, also had
one other very important implication on its operations. With
the successful marketing of their new equipment, the XYZ
Company was forced into handling its own manufacturing. Thus
it happened in the later Twenties that several plants were
either built or bought in order to handle this new phase of
the business.
When the Depression hit, building construction came
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to a halt and the XYZ Company was in Yleed of an additional
product to supplement its sales volume and to fill its excess
plant capacity. Thus, in the early Thirties the company
again entered the residential heating market.
During the hard years of the Thirties the company
depended basically on three products to support the organiza-
tion: schoolroom unit ventilation equipment, home heating and
air conditioning equipment, and industrial unit heaters.
]VIr.H. Brown had continued on as president of the
company until 1935 when he retired. During Mr. Br own 's
presidency the company had grown from a one-man organization
to a company that realized a sales volume of approximately
39
one million dollars a year plus new administrative offices
and several new manufacturing facilities, a reputation for
quality products and a work force that, as of that time, was
unrepresented by a union. As the company had grown and
developed over the years, the number of employees had in-
creased proportionately. The management-employee relation-
,ship was described by a company officer under Mr. Brown at
that time as being "paternalistic" in tone.
Upon the retirement of Mr. H. Brown, his son, Mr. R.
Br-own, took over as president of the XYZ Corporation. Mr. R.
Brown continued in this position until 1950 when the XYZ
Company was purchased by another firm. After the merger of
the two companies, Mr. R. Brown continued on for several year,s
as Vice-President in charge of the XYZ Division of the parent
firm.
Soon after Mr. R. Brown took over as president, the
company and the labor-management relationship underwent some ~ I
i'
dramatic changes. The war in Europe, especially after the
entry of the United States, forced the company to search for
new product markets, since civilian construction was again
brought to a halt. And then, as if this~search for new
product markets wasn't enough to adjust to, the company was
confronted with another new development, namely the entry of
a union, andvvith it a new course in labor-management relations.
The company's search for new product markets proved
to be the easier and more successful of the two adjustments.
Branches of the military services of most of the countries
hO
involved in the war found a great need for some type of
portable heat for men and material. Drawing upon the company's
technical background and present capabilities, portable
heaters for the military were successfully designed and
marketed. As evidence of this success, corporate sales
climbed to about two million dollars in 19h2, and by 194h, to
over four and a quarter million dollars. Sales of portable
heaters in the form of costplus contracts to the Government
1I'Jerethe main contributor to this total volume , with in-
dustrial unit heaters being about the only other contributor.
These two products remained as the company's largest source
of income throughout the Forties with the sale of school-
room ventilation equipment increasing slowly in the latter
part of the decade.
The impact of this abundant new business extended
into almost every phase of the Company's operations and was
in some phases, especially the union-management relationship,
to be felt for many years to come. In tenns of manufacturing
facilities, several additions were built on present plants,
new plants were rented, and new warehouses were purchased.
Some of these facilities were later to be the subject of union
organization and union-management negotiations.
The impact of this business also had profound effects
on the company's employees. Many new people from a very tight
labor market had to be brought in over a very short period.
The total wage bill increased substantially in this period,
going from over $250,000 in 19h2 to as high as $650,000 in
-"~--'- ---.. - .._-_._-. -- _ ..--
1944. This increase was due to several things; neW employees,
many hours of overtime, a loosening of incentive rates, and
slight increases in pay brought on by the appearance of a union.
As mentioned earlier, the second major adjustment the
company had to make early in the war y®a:rs was tQ the presence
of a union. The United Electrical, Hadio, and Machine Workers
of America (Hereafter referred to as the U.E.F.E.) success-
fully organized the employees of the XYZ Company and became
their bargaining representative on April 19, 1943. As to
exactly why the employees found it necessary to seek collective
representation, there is conflicting testimony. Mr. R. Brown
felt that the lIZ Company employees just fell prey to a heavy
organizational drive that was going on throughout the city
at that time. Mr. Brown added that, prior to the introduction
of a large union-organized company to the area, union affilia-
tion had not been very popular.43 Mr . A. Smith, the company's
Secretary-Treasurer at that time, agreed with this reasoning,
with the addition that he felt the New Deal philosophy of the
time wa s influential in making such organi zation drives
successful. L~L~
In discussing this question with the present business
representative; who was a union official at the outset,
different reasons WBre cited for the employees organizing.
43Interview with R. Brown, former president of XYZ
Company, April 1), 1969.
44Interview with A. Smith, former Secretary-Treasurer
of the XYZ Company, on April 23, 1969.
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This official cited three basic reasons behind the union's
success. One, employees were making only 60¢ per hour and
were reluctant to turn in more than 80¢ per hour on the in-
centive for fear of rate cutting. Second, there was a great
deal of favoritism displayed, based on family relationships
and a certain social club affiliation. And third, wages
were low in comparison to those paid larger employers in
the area . These ernployerswere all in the f'a r-m implement
. d LI,5In ustry.
In instances such as these, it is always difficult to
determine which occurred first, an injustice and then a re-
action, or the reaction of the union pointing out the in-
justice, real or imagined. After the issue was raised, how-
ever, it W9.S of only secondary importance whether the in-
justice was in fact real, since for the people involved it II
: I
had become so.
There were several factors present at the time of '! I
i··
the union's arrival on the scene which contributed to making
this a most difficult relationship for the company to adjust
to. The organizational drive had been led by a union business
agent who was an acknowledged Socialist. The union's present
business representative, who workedvvi th the organizer at
that time, described him as "Cl. highly skilled negotiator and
45Interview with T. Maloney, business representative
of the International Association of Machinists, on April 2),
1968.
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nod 1 t . S . 1· t." Lr6ouo a strlct I OCla .is • Management, that is, Mr. R.
Brown and Mr. A. Smith, viewed the union as "militant,
aggressive, not very cooperative, and taking the old hard
line approach to bargaining."
As both Mr. Brown and Mr. Smith pOinted out, the
second major factor which made the union's presence difficult
to adjust to was the fact that company representatives were
completely inexperienced and uneducated in union-management
relations and negotiations. Mr. Smith stated that the company
initially took a "legalistic approach to the union, feeling
that a union contract would be no different than any other
contract". This approach, as Mr. Smith indicated, represented
"a policy of containment".
The company's relationship did not change to any
Significant extent until Mr. R. Brown brought in Mr. B.
Burns as an assistant to the president, specifically for the
sole purpose of handling the union-management relationship.
Mr. Burns, with an extensive background in the field of union-
management relations, brought with him an approach that was
more in line with the union'S. Mr. R. Brown described him as
"a rough, brusque type of individual who seemed to enjoy the
hard approach to the tmion".
The next several years from 1946 through 1949 ap ared
to be years of turmoil for union-management relations. A
contract strike lasting just over a month occurred in 1946,
followed by a twenty-six day contract strike in 1949. In
between these contracts, grievances were numerous and, as Mr.
R. Brown stated, 'were concerned with "trifling issues" for
the most part. In addition to the contracts in 1946 and
1948, Mr. Burns also negotiated the labor contracts in 1949
and again in 1950.
The contract negotiations in 1949 with the U.E.F.E.,
while strike free, involved additional complexities which
were to have several recurrences. The toolroom employees
(tool and die makers, machinists, and apprentices) were the
target of a unit raid by the International Association of
Machinists, District Lodge 102 (hereafter referred to as the
I.A.M.). On August 8, 1949, after a contract had been reached
with the U.E.F.E. in July, the National Labor Relations Board ~:;::j., ~
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gave focmal recognition to the I.A.M. to represent the tool-
room employees.
To recap the events of the Forties and their implica-
tions, we find the XYZ Company moving into a new product
market with characteristics far different from previous or
future markets. By "characteristics" is meant the cost
flexibility involved with cost-plus contracts versus the cost
discipline required to meet competition in the other product
markets. This period of cost-plus contracts and the habits
they engendered were to have a significant impact on future
union-management relations and negotiations.
The significant increase in sales during the Forties
L'r5
also created the need rOT an Ixplnl1cn cf thi company's
manufacturing facilities and an expansion of the labc~ £o~ce.
And with the addition of a militant union, the responsibility
of labor-management relation~ W@l9 ~\(~g:reg6Ltsd for futur'\lilhand=
ling by a specialist in the field.
If the Forties ushered in dramatic changes in the
company's operations, the Fifties were no less hectic. At
the outset the company was in the midst of trying to readjust
to the competition of old product markets within the private
sector of the economy, gear its manufacturing facilities to
handle schoolroom ventilation equipment as the major product,
and to negotiate a merger into another company in the air
treatment industry. One of the first hurdles to be overcome
was the merger. In terms of the merger's effect on operations,
there was a negligible amount of adjustment since, for all
practical purposes, no changes, other than the XYZ's status
as a separate corporation, took place.
Perhaps the change in conditions which involved the
most adjustment, and which had the most far reaching implica-
tions, was the change in product emphasis. While the company
continued to obtain government contract work, the sale of
unit ventilation equipment was again becoming the major
source of income. Competition being what it was at that time,
the company was forced to become far more cost conscious.
In terms of manufacturing,
cost consciousness meant evaluatin~c>
its present equipment, its methods and processes, overhead
expenses, and the productivity resulting from its incentive
system. Needless to say, many of the changes that came out
of this program, especially those relating to the incentive
system, were met with some union resistance.
While Mr. Burns continued wi.t h the company, his
responsibilities changed to become head of manufacturing.
With this change in Mr. Burns' position, Mr. F. Doud was
brought in to set up an Industrial Relations Department. Mr.
Doud came on the scene just prior to the 1952 contract
negotiations which involved a conf'r-orrt at.Lon on those cost
control measures which directJy effected the employees and,
through them, the union.
The company's psychological consulting agency, as a
resuLt of testsand intervievJs, described Mr , F. Doud as "a
" . since he is an aggressive, independent
man and does not possess a strong natural
awareness of the interests, needs, and wants
of those around him, to some persons he may
appear to be s~~ewhat cool, indifferent or
tempermental. ,,-+ '
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highly intelligent man who had the personality st.r-uct ur-e of
a very forceful, aggressive, dynamic individual". However,
the agency went on to state that:
The union business representative that deal t w.it.hMr. F'.
Doud commented that:
"Mr. Doud carne from the J. I. Case Company
which always has been anti-union . . . and
that it took severat8years before the nnjm,
could relyon him." r
47Final Report to person~el Department, XYZ Company,
by the ABC Consulting Agency, Chlcago, dated October 3,
1958 (in the files of the Department).
L,,8Maloneyintervievv, .9J2.. cit.
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An evaluation on Mr. Do~s effect on union-management
negotiations will be hanled later in this paper wheri
negotiations in which heparticipated will be discussed.
As in 1949, the .952 negotiations with the U.E.F.E.
became complicated by anther I.A.M. petition to win bar-
gaining rights for the nintenance men and their helpers.
Finally, on August g, 152, a two year contract was settled
'dithout a strike and inSeptember of that year the National
Labor Relations Board dcided against splitting off the
maintenance men from th production unit. On June 19, 1953,
this contract was extened one year, thus to expire on June
1, 1955.
On February 19,1954, the U.E.F.E. made its first
attempt to expand the hrgaining unit by filing a petition
to represent the produ~ion and maintenance employees at one
of the plants acquired during the Forties to manufacture
products under governrwnt contracts. The National Labor
Relations Board, as a 'esult of a consent election, declared
there was notenough i~erest to appoint the U.E.F.E. as the
bargaining representative and the plant remained non-union
until June, 1955·
Again in ApriJ, 1955 the U.E.F.E.'s bargaining status
vITasthreatened when tIe United Automobile Workers petitioned
the National Labor Re~ations Board for a representation
election covering the production and maintenance employees.
On May 25, 1955, the ~ational Labor Relations Board again
certified the D.E.F.E. as the rightful bargaining representa-
tl'lJ~of'th lc:; e emp~oyees. In commenting on this election, ]VIr.
Maloney pointed out there was considerable turmoil in the
Local regarding the D.E.F.E.'s affiliation with the AF of L -
CIO and that the Local had decided against affiliation with
the United Automobile Workers.
Immediately following the above representation
election, the company and union entered contract negotiations.
This contract negotiation was somewhat unusual in that the
D.E.F.E. 's bargaining unit was extended upon their showing
evidence of interest by the employees at two plants and a
warehouse acquired during the late Forties. Agreement on
this contract was reached on June 2$, 1955, again, without a
strike.
It was during the mid-Fifties that a Senate sub-
comrnittee was investigating unions to validate claims of
various illegal activities and of possible Cormnunist in-
filtration. The D.E.F.E. was one of the unions under
suspicion of Communist infiltration and possible domination.
According to Mr. Maloney, the company's Local of the U.E.F.E.
had given notice to the International that, if they did not
affiliate with the AF of L - CIO, the Local would withdraw
from the International. Finally on December 1, 1955 the
Local voted to switch its affiliation to the I.A.M. The
D.E.F.E. contract was kept in tact after this except for the
necessary changes in identification of the parties to the
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contract.
Just prior to entering contract negotiations in
1957, there was another change made in management. Mr. D.
Nichols was employed to take over the local industrial rela-
tions function under the direction of Mr. Doud who had
moved into another position. Mr. Nichols was described by
the same previously mentioned psychological consulting
agency as:
"Above average intelligence. . quite
sensitive and lacking in self-confidence.
He tends to compensate for this feeling by
being more aggressive in his interpersonal
relationships. However, he is quite sensi-
tive to criticism, rebuffs, and situations
which he feels represents failure. We would
expect his lack of self-confidence to handi-
cap him in his deal~~gs with others in the
organi zation . . ." r
This evaluation of Mr. Nichols' lack of self-
confidence was also referred to by Mr. Maloney who dealt
with Mr. Nichols. It was his opinion that Mr. Nichols "was
a very unstable man who would not commit himself to any
Position". It was also his opinion that "Mr. Nichols did not
hold the employees' respect due to his inability to make
decisions and commit himself one vray or another".
While Mr. Nichols continued in the position of In-
dustrial Relations Manager through the Fifties, he was
terminated in the early 1960's. As one of the company's
49Final Report to person~el Department, XYZ Company,
by_the ABC Consulting Agency, Chlcago, dated October 21,
1959 (in the files of the Department).
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vice presidents stated, Mr. Nichols was bas~cally terminated
becclUse of a deteriorating physical disabil:_ty which appeared
to affect his judgment to the point that responses to normal
industrial relation problems were completely inappropriate. 50
The contract negotiations of 1957 with the I.A.M. led
to the company's first strike since 1945. The strike was
short lived, however, lasting only nine days. This contract
again increased the size of the bargaining unit by adding the
employees at another small plant acquired during the Forties.
Contract negotiations which took place in 1959 we r-e
preceded by another complicating situation wh i ch presented
an interesting backdrop for the negotiations. Just prior to
the negotiations, the corporation reorganized along profit
center lines which split the defense work from the other
products manufactured by the XYZ Division. Thus while profit
wise, and management w.i se , the three plants manufacturing
defense products were independent of the XYZ Division, two of
the plants were included in the same union contract with the
XYZ Division.
In order to make the defense group completely in-
dependent of the XYZ Division, the company thought it
necessary to split the bargaining unit, i.e., split the
two defense product plants from the rest of the XYZ
Division. Agreement with the union on how this would
50Interview with H. Stevens, former Manager of the
XYZ Division, April 1, 1969.
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transpire was reached in January, 1959, six months prior to
contract negotiations. The basis of the agreement was that
the present contract would be adopted for the three defense
plants, if the union could present evidence that they re-
presented a majority of the employees in the third previously
unorganized plant. The impact of this change on the 1959
contract negotiations will be considered later, but let it
suffice to say that the contract covering the XYZ Division
employees was settled without a strike.
Reviewing the course of events from roughly 1950 to
1960, the decade opens with the undramatic merger of the
company into another firm in the air treatment industry.
A more dramatic adjustment almost coincident with this merger
was that of reverting to a peacetime economy and product
markets characterized by severe competition. Also during this
time an industrial relations function was established and
filled by several men with almost conflicting personalities.
The 1950's was also a period in which the union was undergoing
a great deal of change and assault by rival unions for the
right to represent the company's employees. Amidst all of the
foregoing changes, the company continued to grow with sales
climbing from about five million dollars in 1950 to over eleven
million dollars in 1960.
In conclusion, in this part the major historical
elements influencing the company's labor-union-management
relationship and negotiations were considered. While this
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history is far from complete, those areas which pertained to
the development of the topic of this thesis were discussed.
Exactly how each of these events affected each of the several
contract negotiations was not treated here, but will be dis-
cussed in Chapter III as an analysis of each contract is
made.
CHAPTER III
The discussion of the history of the XYZ Company
provides the background in which the dynamics of the
collective bargaining process transpired. With this back-
ground, it will now be possible to examine the contract
negotiations that took place at the XYZ Company over approxi-
mately a twenty year period, with a view toward examining
the applicability or felavancy of the theories discussed in
Chapter I.
The general approach to be followed in this dis-
cussion will be to examine each contract negotiation in-
divid1J.allyin order to determine which factors, among those
thought to be relevant by the theorists, played a major role
in shaping the settlement of the contract. Only major con-
tractual changes will be referred to in this chapter; however,
the complete list of negotiated contract changes may be found
in appendices beginning on page
1943 Contract Negotiations*
After the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America was recognized as the legal representative of the
*A detailed list of negotiated changes was not
Possible due to the lack of information on negotiable items
prior to unionization.
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XYZ Company's employees on April 19, 1943, the parties
entered into their first contract negotiation. This first
negotiation was finally settled on July 29, 1943 without
the n.ecess i.ty of a strike. While there were many of the in-
gredients typically conducive to a strike, there were special
circumstances brought on by the War which made the timely
settlement possible. The specific influences brought on by
the War will be discussed after the more disrupting aspects
of the negotiations have been considered.
While there was a considerable lack of data on the
development of the parties' positions during this negotiations ,
some evidence was available to permit some conclusions on the
applicability of Walton and McKersie's distributive and in-
tegrative bargaining models. The available evidence in-
dicated that had the country not been at war, a "negative
settlement range" would have existed throughout the negotia-
tions, and only if significant movements had been made on the
part of both parties would an agreement have been reached.
This conclusion is reached as a result of considering the
basis upon which the union's demands were formulated and tho,se
upon which the company's goals were based.
Basically the union's demands were of two general
tYpes _ monetary and contractual language. As stated by Mr.
Maloney, the union's position on the monetary issue was dic-
tated by two main factors: (1) the discrepancy between the
Company's existing wage structure and that of other local
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employers (primarily companies in the farm implement industry
who historically have been the highest paying employers in
the area), and (2) the unreliability of the incentive system
and a distrust of the manner in which it was applied. The
fact that the union had stressed these points so strongly
during the organizational drive simply magnified the remedial
demands and lessened the union's flexibility in making con-
cessions.
While the union would have found the above factors
as justification for considerable demands (certainly excessive
demands from the company's viewpoint), the company's position
on monetary issues was influenced far more by the wage and
benefit levels in its industry and in the local area as a
whole than by the wage and benefit levels of the local farm
implement companies alone. Unlike the comparison with the
farm implement companies, the company's wage and benefit
level was relatively high when compared with other companies
Within its ~wn industry and with overall local area averages.
While it would not be necessary that the resulting
goal,s and resi stance points result in a "negative settlement
range", the conclusion that it would have in this case is
based on the following:
1. Excessive union demands brought about by the
increased awareness of the bargaining unit to supposed in-
jUstices pointed out by the union in its organizing drive;
and
2. A conservative management made even more con-
servative by the magnitude of the union's demands, the
socialist leanings of the union leadership, and, as Mr. A.
o .0mlth pointed out, the union's aggressiveness coupled with
the management's lack of experience with unions.
In discussing the wage issue and the manner in which
the parties formulated their positions, it is noteworthy
that throughout the history of this union-management relation-
ship the union used the wage and benefit programs of the
local farm implement companies, organized by a rival union,
as justification for its demands; VlJhereas,the company used
the programs of its industry, several of which were unionized,
and the local area as a whole to support its position. It is
also noteworthy that this manner of goal and demand formula-
tion reflects positively on Torff'. conclusion.
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regarding
the parties' formulation of positions. Briefly, Torff con-
cluded that the various criteria used in formulating positions
are selected opportunisticallY, and that the opportunistic
selection tends to magnify the differences.
Of equal importance to the union as an issue to be
resolved was its demand for protective contractual language.
Mr. Maloney indicated of prime importance in this negotiation
was contract language 1frhichwould so regulate the day to day
relationship that there would be no opportunity for the
51see pages 22 and 23·
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various aspects of favoritism to continue.52 While Walton
and lVIcKersiesee such demands as amenable to "integrative
bargaining", the conditions those authors deem as necessary
for and conducive to this type of bargaining were not
present.
According to Walton and McKersie, one of the first
requirements for integrative bargaining is the mutual identi-
fication of problem areas. Once the problems have been
identified, the authors, state the following factors determine
the effectiveness of the problem solving process: (1) the
"m t"o lvation" to find a solution; (2) a "free flow of in-
formation" regarding the parties' preferences: (3) mutual
"trust"; and (h) "supportive climate".53
The conclusion that the parties could not mutually
agree on problem areas (the first requirement for integrative
bargaing) is based on the following:
1. The company's view that the union's newly won
bargaining status was based on factors external to the
employer-employee relationship rather than on problems with-
in that relationship; and thus
2. The perception of the issues as presented as
being a product of the union itself and not a product of
problems within the bargaining unit; and
52~See page 42.
53Walton and McKersie, !2..£. cit ., p. 13'7·
3. The company's belief that the charge of favori-
tism, the union's main argument for contractual language,
was a fiction used in the organizational drive for its
t: i
emotLonal appeal in drawing votes.)+
Even if it had been possible for the parties to
reach agreement on the identification of problems, the
ef£ectiveness of the integrative bargaining process would
have been minimal due to the obvious lack of trust in the
re~ationshLp, the reservations to freely exchange informa-
tion due to the lack of trust and the lack of a supportive
clima-te. The basis for determining these shortcomings are
as f'olLows e
1. The top management's lack of trust as indicated
by its perception of the union as "militant, C1_ggressive,and
. ,,55not very cooperatlve .
2. The management's reluctance to openly exchange
information, as indicated by Mr. Smith's statement that the
company's approach to the union was basically one of "con-
56tainment".
3. The fact that the first two factors would cer-
tainly not be conducive to management's contributing to a
supportive climate; and
5LI- See page 41.
r::_r/)See page 43.
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4. The fact that the union, in pressing the issues
as mentioned in its organizational drive, created negative
and somewhat hostile feelings among the bEl_rgainingunit and
bargaining cOHLmittee, which were hardly conducive to a sup-
portive climate for integrative bargaining.
It was thus due to the above conditions that true
integrative bargaining was not possible and that the union's
contractual language demands had to be negotiated concurrently
and in t.he same manner as the wage and benef'it .issues . A ai~ ~_g In,
had various wartime restrictions not been in ef'f'ect,it would
be fair to conclude that this situation would have simply
acted to magnify the parties' differences especially on the
monetary issues.
While the above data does not ref'lect on the
applicability of Walton and McKersie's integrative bar-
gaining model as a means of settling certain issues in
collective bargaining, it supports their conclusions on
the necessity for certain conditions to be present for in-
tegrative bargaining to be both possible and ef'f'ective.
As implied in the previous discussions concerning
the parties' diff'iculties in this negotiations, the type of
relationship the parties were developing was itself a
further barrier to settlement. The typology ref'erred to by
Derber, et aL, as "aggression and r-ea.ist anca" seems to be
the most ref'lective of this relationship in that the union's
.inf Luence was high, there existed v.nf'avorableattitude s, an
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unfriendly emotional tone and the high use of pressure.
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EVidence of the presence of these characteristics in the
developing relationship were indicated primarily by the same
factors which were cited for the failure of integrative bar-
gaining to be an actuality,58 and the company's admitted in-
experience in dealing with unions.
As was mentioned at the outset of this discussion on
the 19L
1
,3 negotiations, there was one overriding factor which
acted to neutralize all other considerations in bringing
about a strike-free settlement. This one all-important
factor was not something the local parties could control,
but was a special circumstance brought about by the war.
The union, on a national level, had pledged itself to a no-
strike policy and as additional insurance the government,
through the War Labor Board, had such a restrictive policy on
wage increases that it would have been quite difficult for
the monetary issue to reach serious proportions. These ex-
ternal restrictions made a settlement possible by keeping
the parties' positions within a positive settlement range,
by neutralizing the ill effects of the parties' inability to
utilize the integrative bargaining approach in settling con-
tractual language issues, and by neutralizing the ill effects
of a hostile relationship. While the influences of wartime
573ee
583ee
page 35·
pages 58 and 59·
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conditions made this settlement possible, as will be seen,
it actually only delayed the day of reckoning on the solution
of lssues.
1946 Contract Negotiations*
The parties were not as successful in 1946 in arriving
at a settlement without a strike. Before agreement was
finally reached, the parties had endured a 33 day strike.
The absence of wartime restrictions played a major role in
the occurrence of this strike. The parties were finally un-
inhibited by such artificial restrictions in seeking their
goals. There were, however several internal factors, some of
which were similar to those in 19~J, which directly led to
this strike.
Perhaps the most obviouS factor was the continued
existence of a "negative settlement range" which the parties
were unable to resolve without resorting to the economic
coercion imposed by a work stoppage. The basis for concluding
that a negative settlement range existed, in support of
Walton and McKersie's distributive bargaining model, was the
extent to which the parties' expectations (or positions)
were different the basis on which these positions were,
formulated, and the terms of the final settlement.
The basis for the union'S major monetary demands in
*A detailed list of negotiated changes can be found
in. A ppe nd i x A.
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this negotiations rested primarily on unsatisfactory wage
settlements imposed on it by wartime restrictions; sky-
rocketing co.st of living which had taken its toll of previous
wage increases; an excessive amount o.fovertime for which
relatively low, and in some cases, no premium rates were paid;
and the failure of the incentive system to generate extra
earnings; which was of key importance to a majority of the
employees in maintaining their standarct 0[' 1ivins;. While
the limitations on wage increases imposed by the wartime
restrictions are self explanatory, the other three factors
need further clarification.
During the early part of the war years, the Wage
,Stabilization Board kept firm control on both wage.s and
prices. These controls, however, later loosened first in
the area of prices and sometime later In the area of \OJages .
By the time the freeze on wages began to loosen, wage levels
had fallen appreciably behind price increases. The result of
this situation was that, as union contracts began to expire
and negotiations got underway, unions \oJere demand i.n« tremen-
b
dous wage increases in order to close this gap between wage
levels and price increases. At the XYZ Company the union's
demands included both a substantial wage increase to make up
for previOUS losses, and a cost-of-living clause as protection
against continuing price increase.
The union's demands for increased premiums for over-
time work resulted from the fact that business had increased
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so rapidly during the war years, and labor was so scarce ,
that extravagant amounts of overtime had been scheduled.
While the earnings which result from such overtime are
enj oyed by employees, there is a point beyond which the
marginal utilities of extra money is not worth the loss of
leisure time. As Mr. Maloney pointed out, it was not un-
usual for the employeeS during these years to have to work
seven day weeks.59 To remedy this situation the union
demanded increased penalties on the company for schedulinvo
overtime in the form of increased premiums for hours over
ten per day, Saturday, Sunday and holiday work as such.
system were the result of deficiencies in this system re-
The union's demands for improvements in the incentive
suIting from factors beyond the employees' control. The
company got into several new product lines; customer-demand
required many short run and special orders; and industrial
engineering was unable to keep up with these changes because
it could not supply incentive rates rapidly enough nor supply
well-studied rates. The resulting effect of these deficiencies
was that incentive employees VIere spending increasing amounts
of time on non_incentive work and, when they did get incentive
Work, they had no guarantee that the incentive standard would
generate earnings correspondent with the incentive performance.
As a result, the union demanded incentive rates which would
59Maloney interview, .£E' .0..
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guarantee an employee a minimum of 120 per cent above base
rate when that employee performed at a normal incentive pace
or when an incentive employee was assigned to specific types
O
f' d' d rnon-lncentive work, an an lncrease rate for incentive
employees when vvorking on jobs where incentive standards wer-e
not available.
While the company's position was generally one of
recognition of the need for some rather substantial changes,
its position relative to each of the above union demands was
tempered by various operating uncertainties. Recall for a
moment that during the war years the large influx of govern-
ment contracts caused the company's business to grow from
approximately $800,000 in 1940 to almost $4,000,000 by 1946.
When the end of the war came, the XYZ Company had to look
back to private markets to fill a tremendous void left by the
cutback in government contracts. Specifically the company
realized that a substantial increase was necessary not only
to maintain its present employeeS, but also to maintain wages
at a level attractive to new labor. This realization was
tempered to a level below union demands, however, by the un-
certainties associated with the company's returning to private
markets for a majority of its business, and with the general
course of the economy following the boom of the war years.
One thing the company was certain about, however, was that
the competition in the private markets was going to be more
severe than in government contract work - typically "cost-plus".
- ....-_ --_._. - -
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The difference in the competition characteristic of the two
markets simply meant that the management would have to be
more cost conscious. The company's position also did not
include a cost-of-li ving provision due to the rate atli'lhich
it had been rising and the potential cost obligations such a
provision could mean if it continued to rise.
problems. The company's primary considerations on this
overtime premiums was also tempered by future operational
The company's position on the demand for increased
issue concerned the uncertain demands of future business as
well as the future labor supply.
The union's demands for certain guarantees under the
incentive system were inimical to the company on the basis
of its potential cost, and due to the effect of such guarantees
on the effectiveness of an incentive system.
From a cost standpoint, two of the union's demands on
these guarantees alone would have resulted in an average in-
crease of approximatelY 10 cents per hour for time spent on
assignments where incentive standards were not available and
an average increase of approximately 20 cents per hour for
time spent on specifiC types of non-incentive work. While the
cost impact of these increases would have been minimal had
incentive employeeS been spending a majority of their time on
lncentive rated work, there are twO reasons to believe that
at most no more than 50~ of their available time was spent on
incentive.
Until the late 1960's the company had a fairly
....-. -- --~--~--
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low incentive coverage, and the union was complaining at
this time that there was a substantial lack of incentive
rates.
Because of the lack of data, the full cost impact of
the union's demand for incentive rates which would guarantee
a minimum of 120% earnings could not be judged. However,
due to the fact that both management and union representa-
tives later acknowledged that incentive standards were
rather loose at this time, it would be fair to conclude
that this guarantee was rejected by the company not so much
for its initial cost impact, but on the basis of potential
future costs and on principle.
While the cost of these incentive guarantees played
B key role in the company's decision to reject thorn, of
equal importance in this rejectiOn was the potential implica-
tions of these guarantees on the effectiveness of the in-
Contive system to generate increased productivity. This
resulting effect on productivity was possible in two ways:
1. The effect of premium rates for specific types
of non-incentive work, and work where rates we re not avail-
able, would provide increased motivation for employees to
seck this work in preference to incentive rated work where
increased performance was required; and
2. The misinterpretation of incentive rates guaran-
teeing a certain level of earnings as a new bas. for ex-
panding the earning potential of future rat•• without a
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corresponding increase in performance.
The fact that it was this wide disparity in the
parties' positions that contributed greatly to the Occurrence
of the strike WEtS further substantiated in that (1) a settle-
ment agreement was reached only after these issues were re-
solved;60 (2) the indication from the terms of the final
settlement, relative to the union's initial position, that
this initial position was quite close to its resistance
point; (Referring to Appendix B, the difference betwBen the
union's initial demands and the final settlement was the
exclusion of a cost-of-living provision for a 37 cents per
hour wage increase spread over a two year period). and (3)
the degree tOlf1rhichthe company's position wa s widely di-
vergent from the union's initial demands.
The parties' widely divergent positions In those
negotiations relative to the wage issue also appears to lend
support to Rees' conclusion regarding the relationship of
the business cycle to the tendency of the parties to develop
"incompatible expectations". As previously noted, Rees con-
eluded that such incompatible expectations are most likely
to occur prior to peak business activities.61 In this case
the company's position to a large extent was based upon a
fear that the bus Lness cycle would turn down, as indeed it
60Daily Dispatch, May 21, 1946.
61,see page 25·
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did a f'ew months later. The union, on the other hand, was
reacting to a wartime boom and a period of rapid inflation
which had seriously corroded previous wage increase.
Also worthy of note is the different criteria
(different as compared to the 19h3 negotiations) by which
the partie" formulated their positions, The union's demands
in this negotiations, while to some degree influenced by
local wage compariSODS, WBS to a greater extent influenced
by the effects of inflation on vvages and inequities result-
ing from problems peculiar to this organization. The com-
pany'. position, on the other hand, ~" also influenced by
its ~ge comparisons, but more importantly by future busi-
ness uncertainties. Quite obviously these facts, again,
Support Torff'. conclusion regarding the various criteria
the partie. us. in formulating their positions, but more im-
portantly they support his conclusion that the parties may
Use different criteria at different times during the re-
I L')ationship.o(.,
In addition to the monetary issues, there were many
demand" for changes in contractual langua"e which provided
anoiJ-r1ler' f or t.heuc;e of "integrative b: ..opportunity ,O'~ e<rgalDlng",
However, for the same reasons thaX this type of bBr8aining
Was not possible in 1943, it waS again not possible in the.e
neeotlation
s
, The parties' relationship, characterized a.
62 Torff, .£E. 0-.' p. ~.~..
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"
aggression and resistanCe" in 191,3 became, H anything, more
hostile ( " "1 " , "d) d" hpr1mBrl-y on thO unlon " .' e uXlng t • interim
years. For the most part the company's perception of the
union as an un~rrantod, unfriendly and threatening, forCE
continued unchang;ed. As Mr. Brown, the company spokesman,
stated, these tim •• (the mid-Fortio.) wore characteci"ed by
what were, in hiS estimation, many petty grievancos which,
for the most part, lacked any merit. The fact that the union
was still viewed in this manner resulted In the company'.
continuing it,sapproach along the line of "containment" and
"resistance".From the cm~ents of Mr. Maloney, it appears that the
union saw, in this approach, a lack of respect for, and re-
cognition of, tho union as an entity. As Mr. Maloney stated,
it was this lack of respect for tho un~on, and an inability
to get 1.su
e
• resolv.d botween contracts expeditiously that
lod to B great deal of aggression ~ong the .mploy •••.
It wac, thUS, the parties' rolationship, charac-
terized by attitude. of distD1.t, suspicion Bnd hostility,
which undermIned t,tJe conditions necessary for, and conducive
to, the use of integrative bargaining. Certainly this evideDco,
again, supportS Walton and MeKer"ie'. conclusions that cortain
conditions are necessary for integrative bargaining to be
both possible and effective. The result of the parties'
In ~" t" bargaining was that all l"qs'le
q
a01lity to us. integra1Ve' - • -
had to be negotiated by means of the distributive bargaining
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approach, the effect of which probably tended to magnify the
parties' differences. The basis for such a conclusion is
that, when these two categories of issues are negotiated
together, the parties tend to apply ill defined monetary
values to the contractual language items (integrative topics)
which values then simply become the basis for further dis-
agreement.
One must also conclude that, if the feelings of
suspicion, distrust and hostility, characteristic of this
relationship, led to the failure of integrative bargaining
as a means of settling contractual language issues, these
same feelings must have also presented barriers to reaching
an agreement on the combined issues via distributive bar-
gaining. It would thus appear that a poor union-management
relationship has a compounding effect. By eliminating the
integrative bargaining method all issues are handled w~thin
the eLi ~'e:J:'il:;)'ut;iV@ 1;)ar~ainin.g; framewllrk, Wh5_eh Ls Le ss §.ID@fi@.bl@
for the settlement of such issues and in which the effects of
the ~ame poor relationship are already being felt.
The evidencBt as discussed in both the 1943 end 1946
negotiations, lends support to Dunnette and Kirchner's con-
clusion that a major characteristic of union-management
at,!:,i,tudes'tOw@.:J:"o.s Ol'1e ancl'thar i' a f@@lin~ of distrust and
.' 63SUSpJ_Clon.
In fact, in this cass, it was primarily due
63Dunnet te and Kirchner, .2.Q. cat . , p. 56.
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to the degree to which these attitudes were exaggerated
that the "aggression-resistance" type of relationship
developed.
The facts as discussed in this negotiation also tends
to support Davis' conclusions, regarding management bearing
the responsibility for setting the tone of the union-manage-
ment relationship, and what he termed as the "mirror
rr ,,6Lj,e1 ect . As previously stated, the management's resistance
or containment approach was based on:
1. Its belief that the basis on which the union
obtained bargaining status was not related to any internal
problems or injustices;
2. Its perception of the union as an aggressor, a
threat to the successful operation of the plant; and
3. A need for caution due to management's lack of
experience with union matters.
The union and the bargaining unit in turn, as pOinted
out by Mr. Maloney, perceived in this approach a lack of
recognition and respect fo r- the union which engendered
similar attitudes of distrust, aggression and hostility.
The union's reaction of aggression in turn acted to rein-
force the management's initial evaluation of the union.
The union's and the bargaining unit's aggressive
reaction to the management's approach, as related by
6Lf-D .aVlS, OPe c i t . , p. 57.
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Mr. Maloney, also lends support to Beal and Wickersham's
conclusions concerning the relationship of a union's
experience with a company and "it's militancy, its willing-
. 65ness to strlke". The only evidence available to indicate
that this relationship affected the union's willingness to
strike was Mr. Maloney's statement that this was one of the
!' !'
major factors leading to the strike.oo
It would appear from statements made by Mr. Maloney
that Mr. Burns' addition in 1946 as the company's representa-
tive on union affairs was probably conducive to a strike-
free settlement despite the fact that a strike actually
occurred. Mr. Maloney confirmed Mr. R. Brown's statement
that Mr. Burns was a fairly rough, brusque type of individual,
but that, more importantly, he dealt with the union in a
manner which acknowledged its existance as an integral part
of the labor relations scene. Mr. Maloney also added that,
in contrast to previous negotiations with other company
officials, the union leadership felt that this negotiation
had focused on the issues rather than on time conQ'uml'n~~ '=' power
play maneuvers. It would thus appear that Mr. Burns'
presence on the scene represented a turning point in the tone
of the existing relationship.
In summarizing the events of this negotiations, it
f:r::-.J)Bealand Wickersham, 52E. cit., p. 57.
66Maloney Intervie\tv,52E. cit.
..
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could be concluded that the strike was a result of:
1. The existence of a negative settlement range on
the monetary issues;
2. The parties' inability to apply an integrative
approach to the contractual language issues which resulted
in further complicating negotiations over monetary issues;
and
3. The effect of a rather hostile union-management
relationship in precluding the use of integrative bargaining
and its further inhibiting effect in settling the lssues via
distributive bargaining, despite the introduction of Mr.
Burns into the relationship.
1948 Contract Negotiations*
As in 1946, the parties again had to suffer through
a strike before a settlement was reached. While many of the
complications prevalent in the 1946 negotiations were still
present to a lesser extent, others were not and other com-
plications arose which brought about a 26 day strike.
During the two years following the 1946 negotia-
tions, the union-management relationship improved considerably- '
in that the company finally accepted the union's existence.
This new degree of recognition apparently focused on the
addition of Mr. Burns as the company's industrial relations
*1948 negotiated changes may be found in Appendix B.
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representative and the way in which the union perceived his
approach. As Mr. Maloney stated, while the union recognized
Mr. Burns as a hard bargainer, it also saw in his approach a
recognition of the union and a willingness to discuss issues.
In terms of Derber, Chalmers and Stagner's typo-
logies, the relationship at this time would seem to fall
somewhere between what they term as "aggression and resistance"
and "quiescence".
The relationship was characteristic of "aggression
and resistance", in that the union's scope and depth of
influence in the relationship was high a.swas indicated by
the extensive discussions carried on in these negotiations
over problems related to contractual revisions. In terms of
the improvement in the parties' attitudes and in the friend-
liness of the emotional tone, the relationship was more typical
of the "quiescence" typology. As previously implied, the im-
proved attitudes could only be traced to the partiesY changing
view of each other's role in the relationship initiated
primarily by Mr. Burns. Certainly this change and the manner
in which it came about should be interpreted as supporting
Davis' conclusions concerning the "mirror effect" and manage-
ment's key role in establishing a particular relationship.
As further evidence of the parties' changed attitudes
was the obvious fact that not only was integrative bargaining
used extensively in these negotiations, but resulted in an
extension of negotiations beyond an April 1 contract expiration
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date. The union notified the company on January 31, 1948 that
it was interested in amending and modifying the existing agree-
ment. Between that time and April 11, the parties had ten
formal sessions during which time the discussions centered
only on proposed contractual language revisions. By the
meeting of April 10, the whoI.econtract had been reviewed and
tentative agreements had been reached on many of the proposed
changes. The fact that the parties were able to successfully
use the integrative bargaining approach was further evidenced
by the fact that the union's final list of eleven demands
contained only one unsettled item amenable to this bargaining
method.
The success of integrative bargaining in this negotia-
tion lends support to the applicability of Walton and McKersie's
integrative bargaining model to the process of collective
bargaining. The fact that the parties were able to use this
approach successfully under the conditions of improved
II:
I"
,,'
attitudes, is also evidence of Walton and McKersie's conclusions
that somewhat positive attitudes have to be present for this
approach to be both possible and effective.
The meeting on April 10 was significant beyond just
another session of integrative bargaining, in that this was
t.he f i.rst meet.L rlg at which wages were discuc:sed'-- tl ' ._C • - ~ •. Oleoeglnning
of the "distributive bargaining" process. Since, by the meet-
ing of April 10, the parties had almost exhausted the topic of
language revisions and the company vvas eager to VITap IIp a
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settlement, it insisted that the union make its proposal on
wages. To the dismay of the company, the union's reply was
that a 30 cents per hour across the board increase was needed
unsupported by any specific reference to criteria or justifi-
cation.
Despite the union's seemingly "off-the-cuff" pro-
posal on April 10, the company gave its proposal to the union
on April 23 regarding all monetary issues except for the ex-
act amount of a cents per hour increase. Along with this
proposal the company submitted the following as a basis for
its position on the wage issue:
1. Since 1946 wage increases had totaled 35.1 cents
or 35.Yfo, while the cost of living had increased only 27.8%,
leaving 7 cents per hour over and above the increased cost
of living;
2. Ta_xes had decreas'eci~i[lCe 1916 gl·'Jl·n~err·1- ~~ +~ I::, ~ lp oyees
an additional 3.33 cents per hour in take-horne pay;
3. The company's wage rates were third high in the
industry, exceeded only by companies located in Detroit,
Chicago and Buffalo; and
wages,
4. There were seven other competitors paying lower
some of which had settled union contracts that same
year.
The company's concern with inflationary pressures was
a.gain expressed in a public announcement of its 191+7 fiscal
operating results:
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"High cost s of purchased material and parts
had substantially increased this element in
our unit cost. The company is still under
considerable pressure by labor to increase
wage rates unreasonably. The combination
of these two situ~tion~ sets a pattern whic§7
may affect operatlons In the current year."
Of specific concern to the company was the effect these
pressures could have on hampering the market success of a
recently introduced, completely redesigned product.
The company's final position for a settlement was
given to the union on April 2$ for presentation to the bargain-
lng unit. This proposal included, in addition to the previous
proposals and tentative agreements, a total of ten changes,
the most important of which was a five cents per hour wage
increase with a wage reopener after October 1, 194$. In ex-
change for the inclusion of a wage reopener clause, the com-
pany demanded an absolute "No strike, no lockout" clause.
The union's reply to this proposal on May 3 was
actually the first indication that there was a wide dis-
parity (negative settlement range) in the parties' positions.
The union's reply contained, not only a rejection of the
company's proposal, but also eleven new items covering vvage
issues as a basis for settlement. Specifically among the
eleven items in this proposal, the most important issues were
contained in its demand for the following:
1. A wage increase of 15 cents per hour for hourly
67Daily Dispatch, May 22, 1949.
rated workers and a 10 cents per hour increase for lncen-
tive employees; and
2. Wage increases made retroactive to Ap "1 1
J _ rl ,the
expiration date of the agreement.
The company, on May 4, informed the union that these
wage demands were unacceptable and the company's propo,sal
would be put into effect on May 3 so that negotiations and
plant operations could continue until a final settlement wa s
reached. The union's response to the company's reply
occurred on May 10 when the strike officially began.
Considering the events as they transpired and the
facts regarding the development of the parties' positions,
there could be no doubt that the strike resulted from the
existence of a negative settlement range within a distri-
butive bargaining context. This conclusion is readily
supported by the fact that:
1. The parties' attitudes had significantly improved
as evidenced by the successful use of integrative bargaining;
2. The parties' successful use of integrative bar-
gaining in uncluttering the distributive bargaining process
as evidenced by the fact that the parties had discussed over
that only one of the union's final demands was amenable to
t;2./_such issues,
reached tentative agreement on several, and
the integrative approach;
3. After the meeting of April 19 and right up to the
start of the strike, the parties were negotiating strictly on
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monetary issues;
4. The publicly announced settlement referred only
to the wage issue; and
5. The disparity between the final wage agreement
(9 cents per hour increase for incentive employees and 11
cents per hour for hourly rated employees) and the parties'
positions, especially the company's, right before the strike.
1949, 1950, 1952, 1955
Contract Negotiations*
These four negotiations are considered together
because of the manner of contract settlement, the circ1.:UY!-
stances surrounding the negotiations, and the reasons for
the manner in which the contracts were settled.
Perhaps the most significant similarity in these
ne~otiations was the fact that all were settled without the
C)
occurrence of'a strike. While the issues varied in both com-
plexity and seriousness during these years, there were
several factors present which made a timely settlement the
most probable outcome.
In attempting to identify those factors which made
a major contribution to these settlements, it is well to
first review the development of the parties' relationship.
Referring again to Derber, Chalmers and Stagner's typologies
of relationships, one could see in this period a relationship
evolving from that of "quiescence" in 19LI.8into one of almost
"repressed hostility" by 1955. The relationship at the time
SO
of the 1949, 1950 and 1952 negotiations could probably be
best identified by one of "quiescence" and that during the
1955 negotiations as bordering on "repressed hostility".
The main basis for this determination vilasthe altera-
tions in the parties' attitudes and their ability to discuss
and resolve several serious and complicated issues, and a
changing balance of power brought about by union instability
at a time when the company's bargaining strength was increas-
ing. The most influential of these factors in shaping the
relationship was the union's inability to stabilize its
position as the employees' bargaining representative. This
conclusion is based primarily on the fact that as the union's
instability continued, its influence waned which, in turn,
soured its attitude.
The union's instability manifested itself in outside
union raids on the D.E.F.E.'s bargaining unit and the inability
of the D.E.F.E. to expand its original bargaining unit to in-
clude other local unorganized company plants acquired during
the late Forties and early Fifties. These unstabilizing
events in chronological order were as follows:
1. In March, 1949 the National Labor Relations Board
(hereafter referred to as the N.L.R.B.) held a consent election
at the request of the I.A.M. for representation rights covering
all toolroom employees. In August of that year, the N.LoR.B.
certified the IaA.M. as the toolroom employees' chosen repre-
sentative.
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2. In May , 1952, while the 1952 negotiations were
und er-way, the I.A.M. filed a petition with the N.L.R.B.to
separate the maintenance employees and their helpers from the
D.E.F.E.'s production unit and place them in a separate craft
unit. The I.A.M. was not successful in this attempt, the
N.L.R.B. ruling in September, 1952 that there was not sufficient
skill in an identifiable craft to justify separation.
J. In February, 1954 the U.E.F.E. attempted unsuccess-
fully through an N.L.R.B. consent election to organize one of
the company's newly acquired manufacturing facilities in an
adjacent city.
4. In April, 1955 a local of the United Automobile
Workers' Union petitioned the N.L.R.B. for an election covering
the entire production and maintenance bargaining unit. This
election was expedited due to the rapidly approaching expira-
tion date of June 1, 1955. On May 25, 1955 the N.L.R.B. made
the determination that the U.E.F.E. remained the above em-
ployees' chosen bargaining representative.
In addition to the aforementioned difficulties,
several other occurrences made the union's position uncertain.
In January, 1950, the XYZ Company announced that it had been
acquired by a company located in the South and would continue
to operate as a division of this parent company. While the
partie s, with whom intervielilTswere held, did not comment on
the impact of this change, it could be assumed that it did
nothing to enhance the union's perception of its 01;\)'11 security.
r: ~~"";.---::-;-~:_-:_~: =-:;:. ::_.--
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The last element in the union's questionable position
concerned the problem of securing members. Several present
employees, who were union stewards at various times during
this period, when interviewed said that efforts to recruit
new employees into the union were often unsuccessful because
of the national attention the union was getting for communist
infiltration and domination.
While the early effect of this instability on the
union's attitude was minor, the cumulative effect of frustra-
tion by 1955 served to make the union somewhat dissatisfied
with the relationship. The conclusion, however, that the
parties' attitudes remained positive in the early part of this
period is evidenced by their use of integrative bargaining in
several situations. In November, 1950, some six months after
settling the 1950 contract, the parties were able to agree
on extending this agreement one year, to 1952, by agreeing on
a cost-of-living clause which would increase wages one cent
for every 1.14 point increase in the cost of living. In the
1952 negotiations, the parties were able to completely revise
the incentive system and basic wage plan, which involved both
monetary and contract language implications.
As already indicated, it was not the union's continuing
instability ~ ~ that affected its attitude, but rather the
effect of this instability on the union's influence in the re-
lationship which precipitated the somewhat negative attitude.
The fact that the union's attitude was affected by its
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dissatisfaction with its depth of influence is evidence of
the veracity of Derber, Chalmers and Stagner's conclusion re-
o 68garding this p01nt. The conclusion that this instability
weakened the union's influence and bargaining position 1S
based on the obviously weak internal support the union had to
rely on for bolstering its position. The fact that the em-
ployees had suffered through strikes in 1946 and 1948 probably
further weakened this position in that the union would not
want to further endanger its position by calling the employees
to strike over issues of questionable value.
in a distributive bargaining context was that it increased the
The specific effect of the union's weakened position
affected its goals and resistance points. The fact that the
union's perception of its own strike cost, which in turn
union's problems were so apparent acted to further weaken its
position in that it could not be shielded from its opponents'
attention.
In terms of Walton and McKersie's distributive
bargaining model, the union's situation could be explained
thusly:
From this Walton and McKersie conclude one of the parties'
"The higher the union's strike cost, the lower
the union's estimate of the probability of
success. . the higher the value the opponent
pla~es on his,stri~~ costs, the lower will be his
res].stance pOlnt."
68 Derber, Chalmers and Stagner, ~. cit., p. 37.
69 W~9.1tonand ]VIcKersi8,.£E. ~it., pp . 38 and 60.
main tactical assignments is "to manipulate the strike costs
of the party and the opponent.,,7
0
In contrast to the union's position and also in further
detriment to it, the company was making considerable progress
in its overall operations. Company sales from 1946 to 1955
almost tripled, while profits remained at about the same pec-
centage of groSS sales. Obviously the company had made a
successful transition from predominantly government contract
work to the commercial, industrial and school markets it had
been in prior to the war'. This degree of operational success,
plus the addition of experienced industrial relations men, Mr.
Burns in 1946 and Mr. Deud in 1952, acted to enhance the
company's bargaining capabilities. While, as Mr. lV1a10n9Yin-
dicated, Mr. Doud, unlike his predecessor, engendered some
degree of union distrust, other circumstances prevailed in
bringing about a strike-free settlement.
This situation where the:union position became
seriously weakened and the company's stronger could be seen
as an ideal situation for discarding the union altogether.
which inhibited the company from taking full advantage of its
Upon closer examination, however, there were factors present
position. First, the strikes of 1946 and 1948 and the losses
they engendered were still fresh in the mind of management.
The extent of such losses was pointed out by Mr. R. Br-own in
70 r i.d~., p. 60.
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his public announcement of fiscal 1948 operating results:
"A strike of factory employees during the
first quarter contributed to an operating
loss of a~proximately $158,000 for that
period." (
Of equal importance was the fact that, during the late
Forties and early Fifties, the company was introducing
completely redesigned products to peacetime markets, the
success of which could have seriously been endangered by
a work stoppage. The third factor holding the company in
check was the fact that, basically, the union-management
relationship had improved to such an extent that the company
was more concerned with improving operations within the con-
fines of a contract than with the possibility of ousting the
union altogether.
The resulting effect of the restrictions operating
on the parties was a positive settlement range between their
resistance points. While the union's demands were restricted
by its problems of instability, the company's goals were held
in check by the cost of a possible strike, the credibility of
which was enhanced by previous strike experience, and the
demands of adjusting to changing market conditions. The con-
elusion that the union's position was relatively weaker is
sUbstantiated by the magnitude of the monetary settlement in
71Daily Dispatch, May 24, 1949.
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7?1949 and 1950 relative to the earlier settlements. -
While the 19h9 and 1950 negotiations are adequately
explained by the above discussions of the parties' attitudes
and the development of the parties' positions within a dis-
tributive bargaining context, the settlement of the 1952 and
1955 negotiations were somewhat more unusual.
In 1952 the union entered negotiations with a demand
for a 15 cents per hour increase for hourly rated employees
and a 5 cents per hour increase for incentive employees. The
company countered this demand with a proposal "that any
additional wage increases should be used toward a correction
of the fundamental weaknesses in the present wage plan and
rate structure.,,73 The company's final proposal, while only
granting an immediate increase of ii' cents per hour, involved
a major revision in the wage structure, a new incentive plan
involving extensive contract language changes, aLl of which
involved an additional increase of 6 cents per hour and in-
creased earnings potential under the incentive plan.
Because contract language and monetary issues were
so intertwined in this proposal, and because the union also
recognized the need for vast improvements in the company's
72Referring to Appendices C and D respectively, in
1949 a 5 cents per hour increase was given incentive em-
ployees, and a 7 cents per hour increas~ to hourly rated
employees. In 1950 a 5 cents per hour lncrease was granted
to-all employees.
73The XYZ Company's proposal to the Wage Stabiliza-
tion Board dated June 8, 1952.
~.
I
total wage plan, the parties were able to apply mainly integra-
tive bargaining techniques in reaching agreement within a
positive settlement range. It could thus be concluded that,
while the relative strength of the parties' bargaining
positions was influential to the degree that it established
a positive settlement range, it was the parties' mutual
recognition of major internal and external wage problems and
a desire to resolve it that led to a settlement arrived at
mainly via integrative bargaining.
As previously noted, by the time of the 1955
negotiations, the external challenges to the union's position
had engendered a somewhat hostile attitude. It was the com-
bined effect of this hostility and the following factors
which supported a relationship bordering on "repressed hostili-
ty" : (1) slightly increased union strength which resulted
from its withstanding the challenges to its position; and (2)
the perception of Mr. Doud as somewhat antiunion and thus the
need to deal with him cautiously. It was because of this
hostility, and the parties' relationship, that the probability
of a strike-free settlement could be seen as somewhat
diminished. In addition to the wage offer, the company's
offer to allow the union representation rights, upon evidence
of a majority interest, over employees the union had sought
unsuccessfully to organize in 1954, certainly played a key
role in bringing about the settlement.
For the union, this offer to expand its bargainin~
-=:J ·c)
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unit represented an important opportunity to bring about a
greater degree of stability and thus strength. The company's
rationale in making such an offer was that there was always
the probability that these employees would be organized at
some time and, this being the case, one union representin~
eo
all local employees, under one contract with one expiration
date, would be preferrable to getting an unknown union with a
different contract and expiration date, thereby increasing the
strike hazard. The influence of this offer in bringing about
a settlement should be taken as evidence that the union's
needs for institutional security and/or self enhancement does
at times and to some degree, take precedence over the needs
of the represented employees.
The contracts of 1949, 1950, 1952 and 1955 were
settled without strikes for the following reasons: (1) the
effect of'restrictions on the parties ' positions which re-
suIted in placing their goals and demands within a positive
settlement range; and (2) the existence of somewhat positive
attitudes during the early part of this period which made
integrative bargaining possible during that time.
1957 Contract Negotiations*
During the two year period after the signing of the
1955 agreement, several changes transpired which were to have
*See Appendix G for a detailed list of negotiated
changes.
"grave effects on the 1957 contract negotiations. After
approximately nine years of reletive peaceful relatione, a
nine day strike became necessary before an aglsement could
be r-eached .
In December1 1955, six months after the signing of
the 1955 contract, the local D.E.F.E. membership voted to
chang"s its affiliation to the I.A.M. This move cam~ ab .co . OlXI~,
U.E.F.E. 's national organization to agree to an anti-communist
Pledg:s and thus affiliate with the AF of L-CIO. r't ·W~- ~l.~U5 a.i s o
painted out by Mr. Maloney that while the local union could
have Iwitched it affiliation to several national unions,
it chose the I.A.M. due to the greater degree of local autonomy
allowed by this national. This sW'i'tohin the local's national
affiliation, plus the influence of winning the 1955 election ,
whioh :ree.:rfirm~dits bargaining rights, and the influence of
expanding its bargaining unit in the 1955 negotiations all con-
'cr'ibU'l~ec1 gr®tly -to srtJ:'(imgt;hening 'th~ UJ.1ionis position among
the bargaining ~nit. This renewed strength flom the bargain-
ing positions. The enhancement of the union's position during
these years brought about a change in the character of the
union-management relationship.
In review1 it will be remembered that7 at th® time of
the 1955 negotiations, the partiel' relationship Wi5 typified
as almost "repY'Bssed hostility" due to the weakness in the
union's position. As its position became more sOlidified, one
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could see in the union's approach a demand for a larger role
in the relationship. By the time of the 1957 negotiations,
the union's position had become strengthened to the point
that previous inhibitions no longer hampered its bargaining
power. It was, thus, this increased strength, the somewhat
negative attitudes engendered by the frustrations of an in-
ferior position in the relationship, and the desire to en-
large its role in this relationship, that made the relation-
ship at this time most typical of a transitional phase ln
Derber, Chalmers and Stagner's typology. According to these
authors' continuum of relationships, this phase would be
somewhere between "repressed hostility" and "extensive jOint
participation".
While the union was undergoing interna.l changes, the
company was doing likewise. Since the mid-Fifties, new products
and redesigned products had become a way of life. In an
effort to stay abreast of market conditions, technical as well
as design changes had to be made. These changes alleviated a
sales problem, that of maintaining the company's share of the
market, but it created another within the manufacturing organiz0-
tion. Just as took place after World War II, product chan~es
. D
were being made faster than industrial engineering could es-
tablish incentive standards. The result of this situation was
that the company's incentive employees were spending a great
deal of time on work suited to incentive standards.
The main issues that arose during these negotiations
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were a result of the aforementioned; that is, the union's
attaining a greater degree of stability and desire for a
larger role in the relationship and the failure of the
incentive system to provide opportunities for higher earnings.
In addition to direct wage increases, the union demanded a
union shop clause and a premium rate specifying average earn-
ings for incentive employees who, through no fault of t.hei.r-
own, were forced to perform on non-incentive work.
The union had attempted in past negotiations to obtain
a union shop agreement, but had been unsuccessful because of
its own instability. Management had been successfully able to
avoid such a provision. Management was successful because
there was a sizable group of employees who were not members
of the union and who did not desire to become members, and
because the company was simply in a better bargaining position.
Hovvever, the union now considered the union shop a necessary
culmination of its efforts toward complete and total recogni-
tion as a member of the industrial relations environment. In
contrast to previous years, the union perceived adequate
bargaining unit support to obtain this demand. Since it was
the union, itself, that was bearing the brunt of its inferior
role, it could be assumed that this demand was primarily an
institutional one. Thus, to the degree the union had to
sacrifice other benefits in winning this issue, its OWYl need
took precedence over those of the employees. Certainly such
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a conclusion substantiates other authorities74 findings that
a union's need for self-enchancement or preservation will at
times take precedence over the employees' needs.
The union also had to vigorously support the demand
for premium pay for incentive employees on non-incentive work
due to the fact that: (1) a majority of the employees were in
incentive job classifications, and (2) because these employees
had in fact suffered a substantial loss in earnings due to a
lack of incentive opportunity.
The company's position in opposing the demand for a
union shop was for the most part based on principle. While
management did recognize the fact that more employees had been
joining the union, it also saw a group of employees who were
not joining and who, it felt, had a right to choose whether or
not to become union members.
In responding to the union's demand for a premium
rate for incentive employees on non-incentive work, the company
could only recall the prime role such premium payments played
in the failure of the old incentive system that had to be re-
vised in 1952. Under the old system, premium payments had
resulted in incentive employees seeking every opportunity to
work under non-incentive conditions. The union'S demand in
this negotiation for an average earnings premium rate would
have provided even a greater motivation than under the old
74See page 16.
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system for these employees to do exactly as before.
In terms of Walton and McKersie's distributive bargain-
ing model, there definitely appeared to exist a positive
settlement range in which the par-ti es could have reached agree-
ment. The basis for this conclusion is the fact that tenta-
tive agreements had been reached on other sizable monetary
increases prior to a strike with the one exception of premium
pay for incentive employees on non-incentive work. As implied
in the earlier discussion, and as related by Mr. Stevens, group
manager of the Division at that time, this issue was not re-
sisted so much for its immediate cost implications as it was
for its potential long range undermining effect on a success-
ful incentive program. The issues which thus gave rise to the
strike were not of a monetary nature, but WBre concerned with
the principles of the premium pay and union shop issues.
One could well ask at this paint whether these issues
could have been resolved through integrative bargaining, and
if so, why weren't they. While relationships characterized
by somewhat hostile attitudes would not be especially con-
ducive to integrative bargaining, the issues involved also
were not amenable to such bargaining. First, for integrative
bargaining to be possible, the issues have to be expressed in
terms of a mutual problem. While the problem of large amounts
of non-incentive work could have been approached in this
manner, the problem of union security was unique to only one
of the parties. Second, the element of compromise which lS an
9h
inherent characteristic of the integrative bargaining process
would not be compatible with resolving disagreements based
on principle.
While Robert Dubin's theory of conflict and p0\;ITerin
'7 t:union management relations ) is not sDecifically urldpr
1- ~ ~ study
in this thesis, the reasons just cited for the failure of
integrative bargaining serve to support this theory. DUbin
predicted in his theory that the probability of open dispute
over fundamental issues would be greater when there is a
relative equality of power. In this case the union's position
in this negotiation had become strengthened to the point that
it felt it had the necessary support to win its demands for
a union shop and premium rates for incentive employees on
non-incentive work.
Since the strike was of such a short duration beforp
the company made a major (but not complete) conceSSion, one
might logically assume it had failed to properly evaluate the
7'importance of the union's demands. 0 While this could be a
logical explanation in some cases, it was not the answer in
this situation. As Mr. Stevens indicated, the company knew
full well \11That the major issues wer-e , but for reasons already
stated, was not willing to concede to the dernarids • In effect,
the company's strategy included the possibility of taking a
75Robert Dubin, "A Theory of Conflict and Powc r in
Union-Management Relations", Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 1959-60.
76 See page 26.
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strike if neces,sary to support its position. While not
verbalized as such, the strategy as depicted by Mr. Stevens
involved forcing the union to perceive its strike costs as
greater than the utilities of obtaining its demands. The
union, on the other hand, was trying to convince the company
of the same thing. It could thus be concluded that the strike
was a result of each party's failure to convince the other
that the cost of a strike was greater than the utility of
sticking to its position.
One could well ask at this point if the company's
position, as one of "prinoiple" 7 w~s so adamant on these
issues, then why were major concessions made afte], only a
nine day strike? The explanation for this move did not evolve
from any logical strategy, but was actually the result of an
odd turn of events. Mr. Stevens? who played a key role in the
determination of the company's position, was out of the country
at the time the strike began. In his absence, company officials
at the parent company location gave the directive to settle
the strike under the best possible terms as quickly as possible.
While this directive was not consistent with the company's
initial strategy, it resulted in the two issues being settled
and the strike concluded.
1959 Contract Negotiations*
Unlike the negotiations in 1957, the 1959 negotiations
*See Appendix H for Q detailed list of negotiated changes.
were not burdened with similar burning issues. The settlement
of the premium pay question for incentive employees, while
certainly costly, did not produce the same disastrous results
as occurred under the old incentive system. In addition, the
union security agreement did not bring about any dramatic
changes in the relationship. Certainly the lack of such
issues had a positive influence on the parties' ability to
arrive at a strike-free settlement.
By the time of the 1959 negotiations, the parties'
relationship had developed well into Derber, Chalmers and
Stagner's typology of "moderate joint participation". The
characteristics of the relationship which warrant this
particular typology were: (1) a moderate degree of union
influence, and (2) the presence of generally favorable
attitudes on the part of both parties. Union influence in
the relationship had increased due to the effect of its
several internal changes in increasing bargaining unit support.
The conclusion that the parties' attitudes were
generally favorable, at this time, was based primarily on
their ability to apply integrative bargaining to negotiate
the splitting of the bargaining unit in January, 1959, some
six months prior to contract expiration. This agreement was
precipitated by the company's separating the XYZ Division
into separate organizational entities. The separation in-
volved one organization for defense contract business, and the
other for handling all commercial and industrial products.
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The basis for the above agreement was that, in ex-
change for splitting the bargaining unit along the same lines
as the new company organization, the company would recognize
the union as bargaining representative over employees at the
company's last unorganized plant, upon a show of majority
interest. While the parties' u.se of integrative bargaining
in reaching this agreement was indicative of positive attitudes
at that time, the benefits that accrued to both parties out of
this agreement would certainly indicate that at a minimum a
positive atmosphere was created for the ensuing negotiations.
While the parties' general attitudes towards each
other were positive, there was one factor present which
obviously strained the relationship. As indicated in Chapter
II, Mr. Nichols, who had joined the company in mid-1957, had
become deeply involved in the union-management relationship
by the time of this negotiation. During this time his
apparent over-reactions and indecisiveness had become a thorn
in the union's side. Issues got blown up out of proportion
and settlements were unduly prolonged. It appeared that it
was only Mr. Doud's (Mr. Nichols' predecessor and superior)
stabilizing influence that kept this situation from reaching
serious proportions.
In discussing this relationship and the role of the
parties' personalities in establishing it, there are two major
pOints to be made. Authorities in the field who dwell on a
typological approach tend to think that a particular union-
management relationship progresses uninterrupted through
various stages in finally reaching a plateau of complete
joint participation. The relationship pattern as discussed
in these past negotiations, however, tends to indicate that,
either there is some vacillation between various stages in
progressing to this high level of "joint participation", or
the gray areas between stages have distinct characteristics,
possibly dissimilar from the adjacent stages.
Another obvious conclusion to be drawn from this dis-
cussion concerns the role of the parties' personalities in
influencing a relationship pattern. Mr. Nichols' lack of
self-confidence, as indicated by the ABC Consulting Agency77
was certainly evident in this relationship, as evidenced by
his reluctance, hesitancy, or inability to commit himself to
a position. This shortcoming apparently caused agitation
among the bargaining unit, which in turn, kept pressure on the
union. It could thus be concluded that a lack of self-con-
fidence on the part of either parties' representatives strains
a relationship in that problems take an unduly long time in
getting settled.
While the union-management relationship.had improved
since the 1957 strike, the company's business by 1959 began
shovving the effects of a recession which had started in 1958.
The gross sales of the XYZ Division declined below those of
773ee page 49.
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1955 with profits also declining.
The only major issues to arise during this negotiation
concerned monetary items. The union's main demands centered
on a substantial wage increase, improvements in the insurance
program, and, again, as in 1957, a demand for average earnings
for incentive employees on non-incentive work. The basis for
these demands was a result of unfavorable comparisons with a
local farm implement company's wage and benefit plans.
The company's position on the wage issues was the re-
suIt of forces pulling in opposite directions. On the one
hand, the fact that business had been poor due to a slight
economic recession acted to increase the company's resistance
point. On the other hand, there were the following factors
acting to lower this resistance point:
1. The need to maintain wage scales competitive in
the local labor market;
2. The fact that management had forecasted an upswing
1n the economy which offered the potential of increased sales
and profits. Management, in turn, did not want to endanger this
by the occurrence of a strike, and;
3. The union's increased strength and thus capability
to call a strike, as demonstrated in 1957.
It is noteworthy that Torff's conclusions regarding
the manner in wh i ch the parties establish their positions are
again borne out by the above data; that 1S, the parties select
the criteria for establishing positions opportunistically, and
.J
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that the criteria used may vary from one negotiation to
another. It should also be noted that the specific factors
used are somewhat different than those used in the previous
negotiations. The union, at this time, was not referring to
the cost-of-living to justify an increase78 (due to the effects
of a recession in holding down the cost of living), while the
company was using the effects of the recession as a basis for
tempering the union's demands.
In terms of Walton and McKersie's distributive bargain-
ing model, it certainly appeared that the parties' resistance
pOints, which resulted from the influence of the above factors ,
formed a positive settlement range in which an agreement could
be reached. Considering the substantial increase that was
finally given (substantial considering that a recession was in
progress and that the wage increase alone amounted to approxi-
mately 9% over two years) it appeared that it was the company's
eagerness to avoid a strike that brought the parties' positions
together within this settlement range.
In summary, it appears that the follovving fact ors were
of major importance in the parties' reaching a strike-free
settlement in 1959:
1. The effects of an improved relationship in creating
a positive atmosphere for negotiations, and in allowing the
parties to focus their attention on the issues rather than on
78The cost-of-living clause agreed to in 1950 wasdropped as part of the 1952 contract settlement.
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unfruitful interactions such as power plays;
2. The fact that no issues of "principle" or
ideology in 1957 came up in the preceding two years to deter
an agreement; and
3. The conclusion that the parties' positions, as
influenced by previously mentioned factors, were within a
positive settlement range thus increasing the probability
of a timely settlement.
'~
CONCLUSIONS
While the field of Industrial Relations was late in
I . foelng recognized as an area worthy 0 special study, much has
been accomplished in the last forty years in furthering
knowledge of the dynamics of this field. Specifically, a
great deal of the research has focused on one primary process
within the industrial relations field - the collective bargain-
ing process. As pointed out In the Introduction, the purpose
of this study was to further the present understanding of this
process by testing severa.l of the more reknown theories of the
dynamics of collective bargaining.
Specifically, an attempt was made in this study to
identify those variables which are determinative of the out-
come of collective bargaining; that is, a strike or timely
settlement. In pursuit of this objective, special attention
was given to validating Wa.lton and lVIcKersie's "distributive"
and "integrative" bargaining models, and Derber, Chalmers and
Stagner's continuum of relationships and the effects of these
relationships on collective bargaining. The data from which
conclusions were drawn resulted from an analysis of some nine
separate contract negotiations at one company over a 17 year
period.
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As a result of this study, it is fair to conclude
that Walton and McKersie's distributive and integrative
bargaining models are reliable as theoretical constructs of
the collective bargaining process. Within the distributive
bargaining ocess the parties were shown to have two major
points of reference corresponding to Walton and McKersie's
terms of "goals" and "resistance pOints". As Torff had found,
these points were determined by the parties' selective use of
contrasting criteria which varied from one negotiation to
another. Torff's conclusion that the parties' opportunistic
selection of various criteria increasing the probability of a
negative settlement range was probably most amply illustrated
in the 1946 and 1949 negotiations.
Once the parties had settled on their positions, the
negotiating sessions served the function of chances to alter
these positions. As stated in Chapter I, Walton and McKersie
borrowed the terms of "utility", "subjective probability" and
"subjective expected utility" from decision theory in explain-
ing this negotiating process. Because the contract negotia-
tions utilized in this study occurred as many as 26 years prior
to this writing, the data necessary to examine this process of
altering expected utilities as Walton and McKersie theorized
were not available.
Walton and McKersie's theory that the parties to
collective bargaining settle issues outside a distributive
context was also validated in this study. It was shown,
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especially in the 1945 negotiation, that under certain
conditions the parties were able to settle issues within an
integrative context. The one condition that appeared most
important for integrative bargaining to be effective was a
relationship consisting of mutual trust and positive attitudes.
Without these attributes in the relationship, the other con-
ditions depicted as necessary for integrative bargaining to
be effective, namely a free flow of information, motivation,
and a supportive climate, appeared to be stifled.
The one area, outside of economic issues, where in-
tegratj.ve bargaining does not appear to be feasible is on
issues involving "principles" or "ideologies". The failure
of integrative bargaining for settling such issues was
demonstrated in the 1957 negotiation where a work stoppage
occurred over the parties' inability to settle the issues of
union security and premium pay for incentive employees. The
reason for the failure of integrative bargaining on such
issues is apparently due to the extreme difficulty or im-
possibility of the parties to view the issue as a common
problem.
As a part of this study, Derber, Chalmers and Stagner's
continuum of relationships was reviewed for its validity in
depicting the manner in which collective bargaining relation-
ships develop and for its implications for the collective
bargaining process. As a result of the analysis in Chapter
III, several conclusions appear justified. The continuum of
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relationships as developed by these authors does not appear
to be reflective of the manner in which a collective bargain-
ing relationship develops. As the authors, themselves,
suggested, their data was apparently biased by the fact that
all the relationships in their study were analyzed at a specific
point in time instead of over a lengthy time interval.
Specifically, in the relationship under study, it appeared that
a stage of "repressed hostility" and "hostility" preceded the
stage of "moderate joint participation" instead of following
it.
Due to the inconsistency of this data with that of
Derber, et aI, this author concludes that in a continuum of
relationship patterns, each significant stage of increased
Joint participation is quite possibly preceeded by repressed
hostility and then hostility. This conclusion is prompted by
the fact that levels of joint participation involve some re-
mision of one of the parties (generally management) ability to
take unilateral action. This ability to initiate action has
historically been conceived of by management as an "inherent;
right" which it has obviol1.s1ynot given up easily. The initial
reaction_to this hesitancy is probably repressed hostility due
to the uncertainties (both legal:and strategic) of the union's
position in overcoming this block.
The second major point that came out of this review of
relationship patterns was that the tone of the parties' re-
lationship appeared to be a determinant of alternative bargain-
ing methods available to the parties. As was pointed out in
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the 1946 negotiations, a relationship characterized by
hostility, suspicion and distrust limits alternative bargain-
ing methods in that true integrative bargaining is not
possible. Thus, a,sin the case of issues l"n"volvl"flg" "lprlnclp~es,
a poor relationship forces the parties to negotiate all issues
within a distributive bargaining context.
Other relevant conclusions regarding factors important
to the conflict-free settlement of contract negotiations
which came out of this study were as follows:
1. Rees' conclusion that there is a relationship
between the business cycle and the tendency for the parties
to develop incompatible expectations was validated by the
outcome of the 1948 negotiations;
2. A relationship of hostility quite possibly affects
the union's militancy and willingness to strike as Beal and
Wickersham concluded;
J. As other authorities in the field have concluded,
the union's institutional needs for self-enhancement and pre-
servation does at times take precedence over the employees'
needs; and
4. The personalities of the negotiators, themselves,
have more of an indirect affect on negotiations through the
resulting relationship than a direct affect.
As mentioned in Chapter III, certainly there are
other factors that were not reviewed in this study which come
to bear upon the collective bargaining process. Research in
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the area of perception and communication would obviously be
two fields having implications on this process. It was only
because the data available in this study was not adequate to
consider such factors that they were excluded.
As a result of using the methodology in this study, an
interesting sequel would involve studying several negotiations
as they are in process. Such a study would allow a detailed
analysis of the applicability of decision theory to collective
bargaining, an arithematical analysis of the parties' "goals"
and "resistance points", and some insights into the role of
perception and communications.
APPENDIX A
1946 Negotiated Changes
I. Wages
A. In the first year incentive workers' base rate
was increased 18.5 cents per hour, which would generate a
total increase of approximately 22 cents per hour when the
incentive workers' efficiency would also be computed on this
basic increase. For those employees on hourly rated jobs, a
18.5 per hour increase was simply added to each individual's
hourly rate.
B. In the second year a 15 cents per hour increase
was granted to both incentive and hQurly rated employees. How-
ever this increase was not included in the base rates, but 1pJaS
computed separately for all hours worked. For incentive em-
ployees this would simply mean that they would not generate
additional earninga by multiplying their incentive efficiency
by a higher base rate.
C. The shift premium was changed for third shift
employees from 5 cents per hour to 7 cents per hOU1~ while the
second shift premium remained the same at 5 cents per hour.
D. A paragraph was added in this contract to make
merit increases within the established rate ranges a function
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of management, but with another provision ~rtch aDow the
union to grieve on such increases.
E. The "piece rate plan" was updated and several nevI]
paragraph. were added to the contract in way of explanation
and improvements for the employees.
1. Incentive employeeS were guaranteed that an
estGblished rate would allow them to perform at a minimum of
120 per cent.
2. Incentive employeeS were guaranteed 120 per
cont of their base rate when assigned to specified types of
day work. 3. A premium rate for hours worked on assign-
ments where incentive standards were not available.
4. Contract language was added to cover pay
arrangements for incentive employees temporarily transferred
to an hourly classification.
5. A paragraph was added to protect incentive
rates from being changed without specific changes in job
content. 6. Incentive rates were also made subject to
the grievance procedure in this contract.
II. Hours of Work and Overtime
A. A paragraph waG added d"fin~ng a work week in term.
of its beginning and end.
B. Contract language was added to provide rest periods
of ten minutes in tho morning and ten minutes in the afternoon.
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C. The following changes were made in overtime pay:
1. Language added to provide double time for over
ten hours in one day instead of time and one-half for all hours
over eight as in the 1943 contract.
2. Contract language added to pay time and one-
half for all work on Saturday as such in lieu of the 1943
contract provision which only provided time and one-half for
over 40 hours per week.
3. Double time was added for all work done on
recognized holidays and Sundays in lieu of the 1943 provision
wh i ch called for time and one-half.
4. The paragraph stipulating overtime computa-
tion for incentive employees was changed to state that their
pay would be based on the total earnings in the week divided
by the total hours worked. This language replaced the statement
that overtime pay for incentive employees would be based on
actual earned rates.
III. Non-discrimination
A. Contract language was added to prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, and creed.
IV. Leaves of Absence
A. The one year limit on leaves of absence established
in the 1943 contract for union business was dropped.
V. Seniority
A. The probationary period for new employees was
changed from three months to two months.
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B. The amount of time on layoff without loss of
seniority was changed from 24 to 12 months.
C. The concept of the departmental seniority system
was left unchanged, but the ocedure for bumping under such
a system was spelled out in detail in this corrtract.
VI. Temporary Transfers
A. The company added language making it management's
right to transfer employees where needed.
B. The union added language defining when such a
temporary transfer becomes a permanent transfer.
VII. Discharge
A. A paragraph was added requiring the company to
notify the chief steward the same day an employee was dis-
charged.
VIII. Grievance Procedure
A. A sentence was added to the introductory paragraph
to provide that any grievande settlement made directly between
the employee and management would be non-precedent setting.
B. Language in the first step of the grievance pro-
cedure was changed to provide that the grievance be put in
writing at the conclusion of thi- .tep jf it were not settled.
The 19l+3 contract provided for the vvriting of a grievance in
its second step.
grievance in the third step was spelled out in more detail.
D. Contract language was added to state that the cost
C. The time limits and the
ocedure for handling the
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of arbitration would be borne equally by both parties.
IX. Union Business on Company Time
A. The 1946 contract increased the one hour allowance
per vI/eel\: for' uni on commatt.emen to the follovving allowances:
grievance committee -- 2 hours per week; chief steward 5
hours per week; shop stewards -- 2 hours per week.
.~
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APPENDIX B
1945 Negotiated Changes
I. Wages
A. A 9 cent per hour wage increase was granted to
incentive workers and an 11 cents per hour increase was
granted to employees on hourly rated jobs.
per hour to 7 cents per hour for second shift employees and
B. The shift premiums were increased from 5 cents
the third shift premium was increased from 7 cents per hour
to 10 cents per hour.
II. Vacations
employees with 15 years or more seniority 3 weeks vacation.
A. The vacation schedule was improved by giving
III. Seniority
A. A system of classification seniority was esta-
blished.
tract as to the order in which employees bump. This procedure
B. The layoff procedure was formalized in the con-
recognized the neW system of classification seniority.
C. A paragraph was added in the layoff and recall
section to the effect that employees refusing recall within
90 days into a job in the sam. labor grade would loose hi"
113
'II
Ilh
seniority.
D. Contract language was dropped on giving laid off
employees a one year extension of their seniority after being
laid off for a specified period of time.
IV. Transfers and Promotions
dr~pped BDd in its place language wac iDserted allowtng the
employee to refuse a transfer beyond the first day if work
was available in his regular job classification.
B. Contract language vIas added specifying eXclctly
how temporary transfers were to be paid.
V. Grievance Procedure
A. The permanent transfer language er one day vVct:3
changed to allow the partie. 4B hour" instead of 24 hours to
reach a settlement before processing the grievance on to the
next step.
A. The second step of the grievance ocedure was
provide for the appropriate meeting within 72 hours instead of
laneuagB which called for a meeting (preferably within 48
hours) .
B. The third step in the procedure was altered to
APPENDIX C
1949 Negotiated Changes
I. Wages
A. A 5 cents per hour wage increase was granted to
incentive employees and a 7 cents per hour increase to hourly
rated employees. The 5 cents per hour increase granted to
incentive employees was not to be included in their base rates
upon which incentive earnings could be generated.
B. The language on the merit increase system was
changed to require a minimum increase of 5 cents per hour.
C. The language on the procedure to question incen-
tive rates was formalized and went from a three step to a six
step procedure.
D. The general categories of non-incentive work for
which incentive employees would be paid at a special pr-smi.um
rate were increased from 7 to 19·
E. Two new job classifications were added and slotted
within the grade structure.
F. The upper limit on one rate range was increased by
4 cents per hour.
II. Hours of Work and Overtime
A. Contract language was added to allow the company
upon union agreement to schedule special work weeks.
1-L5
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A note was added to the i . -Iover :;lYne_anguage allow-
lng for special arrangements on overtime equalization.
B.
III. Holidays
A. For the first time qualifications were added to
the contract for determining eligibility for holiday pay.
B. Probationary employees, employees on layoff,
retired employees, employees terminated, employees on
vacation, and employees on a leave of absence were all ex-
eluded from holiday pay eligibility.
IV. Miscellaneous Language Changes
A. A paragraph was added to the preamble stating that
it was the parties' intent to have the contract coincide with
requirements of federal and state law.
B. The toolroom employees were excluded from the
delineation of the bargaining unit.
C. Language was added to require that union stewards
must have seniority, they could not be probationary employees.
D. Prior language allowing for strikes and lockouts
after an exhaustion of remedies was changed to prohibit
strikes and lockouts for any reason duri.ng the term of the
contract.
E. The language specifying the checkoff procedure
dues and initiation fees was discontinued as a part of the
was altered to make it less formal. Also the amount of union
contract.
F. The company agreed in this contract to furnish the
union one bulletin board for its exclusive use.
APPENDIX D
1950 Negotiated Changes
I. Wages
A. A 5 cents per hour wage increase was granted to
both incentive and hourly rated employees. Again the 5 cents
per hour increase was not included in the incentive employees'
base rate.
B. In November of 1950 the parties further agreed to
a cost-of-li ving alLowaric e which provided for a 1 cent adjust-
ment for every 1.14 point rise in the cost-of-living index.
C. Language was added to clearly specify the manner
in whi.ch incentive employees would be paid when wcr-k i ng on
defective work.
II. Holidays
A. Holiday pay for Lncentive employeesvvas increased
by approximately 20 cents per hour. This increase was the
difference between incentive employees' base rate and the
special premium rate paid for non-incentive work.
III. Vacations
A. The calculation of vacation pay was changed from
the average earning rate for incentive employees and the base
rate for hourly employees to a percentage of annual earnings.
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The percentages agreed upon increased vacation pay by .8%
for all employees exce those eligible for only one week
vacation and their increase amounted to 1%.
B. The vacation eligibility rules were changed by
requiring a minimum of 125 days attendance during the
vacation year and the term "employee" vIasdefined f'or-
vacation purposes.
C. The language regarding the scheduling of vaca-
tions VJas revised to allow employees to schedule vacations
anytime during the year as long as it fit production schedules.
IV. Temporary Transfers
A. Contract language was clarified on incentive rate
application for employees temporarily transferred to another
job.
V. Grievance Procedure
A. The language covering the first step of the pro-
cedure was clarified as to the time limits and the manner of
processing.
B. The third step language was clarified as to the
state of a grievance prior to going to arbitration.
APPENDIX E
1952 Negotiated Changes
I. Wages
A. A general wage increase of 4 cents per hour
was granted to all employees. This increase did not re-
quire Wage Stabilization Board approval and was considered
apart from the proposal to the Wage Stabilization Board.
B. As a result of obtaining the approval of the
Wage stabiHzatiOn Board the following changes were made
in the wage plan:
1. The incentive plan was changed from a "piece
Rate Plan" to a "Standard Hour Plan".
2. The rate range and merit increase system was
changed 1;0 a "One Rate Plan" for both incentive and hourly
rated employees. This change involved fre •• ing former in-
creases which were paid as a bonus on top of hourly eamiDgs
and the earnings generated by the cost-of-living increases
jnto the Dew base rates. These increases amounted in total
to 40 cents por hour for incentive employ.". and 42 C"uts
per hour for hourly rated Imploy ••S, The total increase
brought about by the change to 8 one rat. plan in addition
to the 4 cents per bOur increase preViouslY mentioned'fil'
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10 cents per hour.
c. 'The "Standard Hour Plan" and the "One Rate Plan"
as approved by the Wage Stabilization Board also involved the
following changes:
1. Incentive employees would no longer be paid a
special premium rate for non-incentive work, but would be
paid at the new base rates.
2. It was agreed that incentive rates would be
set to generate 125% instead of 120% called for under the old
plan.
3. Incentive employees would no longer be paid
h " 1 or-em.i urn rate for hoLl" dayt. e s pe c i a 1· - , but would be paid
at their new base rate. This change would actually amount to
a 6 cents per hour increase for these employees.
4. The elimination of all the provisions under
the old contract which set forth the various types of non-
incentive work for which employees would be paid at the
special premium rate.
5. It was agreed that all rates were to be re-
studied for the purpose of establishing the 125% earning
potential and for the purpose of setting realistic standards
in lieu of the loose ones which had been established under
the old system.
6. It was also agreed that when incenti ve em-
ployees were temporarily transferred to other classifications,
they would be paid at their base rate, the base rate of the
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job to which they were transferred, t.he rior - e lncentive earnings
generated on this job, which ever was highest.
II. Hours of Work
A. The shift hours were spelled out in the contract.
B. The fact that half hour lunch periods were pro-
vided was also spelled out in the contract.
III. Seniority
A. The classification seniority system was refined
by requiring three months time in one classification before
gaining seniority in that classification.
IV. Grievance Procedure
A. A paragraph was inserted in the third step of the
procedure which allowed the company to enter the fact that
there was a question of contract interpretation.
V. Leaves of Absence
A. Language restricting an employee from working
while on a leave of absence wa,seliminated from the contract.
B. A one year limit was placed on leaves of absence
vided that they would not accumulate seniority beyond one
except for employees on lmion blJsiness and then it was pro-
year.
VI. MiscellaneouS Language Changes
A. Language was inserted limiting the type of
materials union officials could post on their bulletin boards.
B. Contract language was added which stated the com-
pany would post all vacant jobs before hiring a new employee.
APPENDIX F
1955 Negotiated Changes
I. Wages
A. A 10 cents per hour wage increase was granted to
all employees in the first year and a 5 cents per hour wage
increase was granted to all employees in the second year.
B. A 3 cents increase was granted to the existing
premium for second shift employees which made the shift
premium for both second and third shifts 10 cents per hour.
II. Vacations
A. Vacation eligibility requirements were changed
from 125 working to 150 working days.
B. The three days vacation plus the applicable pay
for employees with less than one year of seniority was
eliminated.
C. Employees with 10 to 15 years of service and who
had two weeks of vacation coming were given an additional 1%
of annual earnings for vacation pay.
D. Employees with 15 years seniority and entitled to
three weeks vacation were alsO given an additional 1% of
annual earnings for vacation pay.
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III. Holidays
A.
total to 7·
B. Special qualifications were added for the
One additional holiday was added bringing the
Christmas and New Year holidays.
IV. Seniority
A. Language was added making probationary time not
cumulative in a 12 month period.
V. Leaves of Absence
A. The freeze after one year on the accumulation of
seniority for employees on union business leave was eliminated.
VI. Miscellaneous Language Changes
A. Paragraphs dealing with company and union dis-
crimination on the basis of union membership was deleted.
B. The basis for the number of stewards was changed
to coincide with the number of specified departments.
C. The language under the incentive system was
altered to make it the responsibility of the chief union
steward to ask for removal of incentive rates put in question.
D. Language was added to give shift preference to
senior employees.
E. The language specifying the bumping procedure was
simplified and allowed for both a classification seniority
system and then plantwide seniority.
F. Language was modified to give the company one day
to notify the chief steward of any discharge in lieu of the old
reauirement of notification on the same day.
APPENDIX G
1957 Negotiated Cahnges
I. Wages
A. A 10 cents per hour wage increase was granted to
all employees in the first year and a 7 cents per hour wage
increase was granted to all employees in the second year.
An additional g cents per hour increase was granted to em-
ployees in hourly rated classifications.
B. An arbitration was added as a final resort on
questions of pay rates or new Or changed jobs.
C. Three job classifications were upgraded.
II. Insurance
A. A major medical provision was added to the life
insurance program with employees paying a percentage of the
premiwn cost.
III. Incentive Plan
A. A new provision was added wh i ch would result in
incentive employees being paid a special rate (this rate
amounted to 14 cents above base rate) for three general
categories of non-incentive work.
IV. Holidays
A. The holiday qualifications were changed to grant
probationary employees pay for holidays falling within their
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probationary period once they had completed probation.
V. Hours of Work
A. Language v-lasadded to allow the company to change
the shift hours as specified in the contract with union agree-
ment.
VI. Grievance Procedure
A. The language in the second step of the procedure
was changed to provide that the parties involved would include
the chief steward and personnel supervisor instead of the
plant superintendent.
VII. Miscellaneous Language Changes
A. The language specifying the extent of the bargain-
ing unit was altered to include two additional plants and one
li'Jarehouse.
B. The checkoff provision in the contract was altered
to provide for automatic renewal of checkoff from year to year.
C. A new provision was added which called for a
maintenance of membership agreement.
D. The language governing the number of union ste'vvards
changed to allow one steward for each foreman and assistantwas
foreman rather than One steward per department.
E. Language was added to provide that overtime was to
be equalized among full time oyees.
F. Language was added to specify a morning and after-
noon rest period.
G. The company agreed to pay five dollars for the
price of prescription safety glasses.
APPENDIX H
1959 Negotiated Changes
I. Wages
A. A wage increase of'15 cents per hour v\fasgranted
to all employees in the first year and an 8 cents per hour
increase was granted to all employees in the second year.
II. Vacations
A. The eligibility requirements for vacation benefits
were changed back to the 125 working day requirement.
B. Employees with 10 years seniority were granted
the third week of vacation.
C. The contract language covering the timing of
vacations WEts cl_lteredto allow the company to ehut. d own dur-
ing the summer months for the purpose of vacations.
Insurance
A. The following changes were made in the company's
insurance ogram:
III.
1. Life insurance was increased from $1,000 to
~t3,000.
2. Accidental death insurance was also increased
from $1,000 to $3,000.
3. The weekly sickness and accident benefit was
increased by $10 per week for a total of $50.
l
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IV. Seniority
A. A clause was added which disallowed salary
employees, wh o had never been in the bargaining unit, to
accumulate seniority subsequent to June 1, 1959.
B. Several minor references to the old departmental
seniority system were deleted from the contract.
V. Miscellaneous Contract Changes
A. The recognition provision in the contract was
changed to show the split off of the defense products plants
into a separate bargaining unit.
1
~ ----------------
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